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Resumo 
 
A tese é composta por três ensaios sobre complementaridades estratégicas e intermediação 
financeira, incluindo trabalho teórico e empírico. O primeiro ensaio é um estudo sobre global 
games aplicados à macroeconomia e às finanças. O segundo ensaio mostra como a 
intermediação financeira atenua a falta de coordenação dos indivíduos com informação 
privada, quando o retorno individual é crescente no investimento agregado. O terceiro ensaio 
destaca o papel das complementaridades estratégicas na relação entre o crédito bancário e o 
investimento. 
O primeiro ensaio resolve global games aplicados à macroeconomia e às finanças. Nele 
analisamos o papel da informação pública e privada na determinação do equilíbrio único e 
discutimos o papel dos preços de mercado. Examinamos também o impacto da informação 
pública no bem-estar social, comparando modelos com e sem complementaridades a nível 
agregado. Reunimos num único ensaio as contribuições mais relevantes no tópico. 
Indivíduos descentralizados não internalizam as externalidades positivas do seu investimento 
no retorno dos outros, investindo assim muito pouco. Como é que os intermediários 
financeiros permitem uma coordenação mais eficaz no mercado? Como é que os bancos 
afetam o investimento e o bem-estar social em equilíbrio? A nossa análise baseia-se no 
modelo de Angeletos e Pavan (2004), adicionando ao seu modelo intermediários financeiros 
(também chamados de bancos); os bancos são capazes de reduzir a volatilidade dos 
fundamentos económicos subjacentes às empresas, monitorizando-as e, como resultado, os 
bancos são capazes de oferecer produtos financeiros que pagam um retorno relativamente 
constante. 
Analisando as indústrias Portugueses no período entre 2006 e 2012, testamos o nosso modelo 
teórico no terceiro ensaio, mostrando que as indústrias com fortes complementaridades 
estratégicas revelam maior sensibilidade à contração de crédito. Mais especificamente, a 
contração de crédito deve ter impacto diferente entre indústrias e áreas geográficas. 
Conduzimos o nosso estudo utilizando a base de dados Sabi.  
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Abstract 
 
The thesis comprises three essays on strategic complementarities and banking, including 
theoretical and empirical work. The first essay is a primer on global games applied to 
macroeconomics and finance. The second essay shows how financial intermediation 
mitigates the coordination failure for individuals with private information, when returns are 
increasing in the aggregate level of investment. The third essay sheds light on the role of 
strategic complementarities in the relationship between bank lending and investment.  
The first essay shows how to solve global games applied to macroeconomics and finance. We 
ascertain the roles of public and private information for the determination of a unique 
equilibrium, and discuss the informative role of market prices. We also examine the impact of 
public information on social welfare, comparing models with and without complementarities 
at the aggregate level. We collected in a single paper the most relevant contributions in the 
field. 
Decentralized individuals do not internalize the positive externality of their investment on the 
return of others, thereby investing too little. How do financial intermediaries permit more 
effective coordination in the market? How do banks affect equilibrium allocations and social 
welfare? Our analysis builds on the model of Angeletos and Pavan (2004) and we extend 
their model by adding financial intermediaries (also called banks); banks are able to reduce 
the volatility of the underlying economic fundamentals of individual firms by monitoring 
them and, as a result, banks are able to offer financial products which pay a relatively 
constant return. 
By analyzing Portuguese operating firms for the period between 2006 and 2012, we test our 
theoretical model in the third essay, showing that industries with strong strategic 
complementarities exhibit stronger sensitivity to a credit contraction. More specifically, a 
credit contraction should have different impact across industries and geographical areas. We 
conduct our study using Sabi database.  
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A Primer on Global Games Applied to Macroeconomics and
Finance
Essay 1
June 2014
Abstract
This paper shows how to solve global games applied to macroeconomics and nance.
We ascertain the roles of public and private information for the determination of a unique
equilibrium, and discuss the informative role of market prices. We examine the impact of
public information on social welfare, comparing models with and without complementar-
ities at the aggregate level.
Keywords: Global Games, Financial Crises
JEL Classication Codes: C72, E44
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1 Introduction
Global games are static coordination games, with strategic complementarities and incomplete
information.1 In this class of games, a players playo¤depends on his own action, the actions of
other players, and some unknown economic fundamental. Because of incomplete information,
individual actions are motivated not only by beliefs about the unknown economic fundamental,
but also by beliefs about beliefs held by other players.
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show that a global game in which private information is
su¢ ciently precise has a unique equilibrium. This class of games has been extensively applied
to macroeconomics and nance, since the contribution by Morris and Shin (1998). Our paper
characterizes and relates recent applications in the literature, classies a variety of models
according to strategies and payo¤s, and claries the role of the main assumptions within each
contribution.
Comparing results across models is hard, because of the diversity of setups applied in the
literature. To overcome this di¢ culty, we chose to rewrite the main models with homogeneous
notation. We use u to denote the individual payo¤ functions and W for social welfare, we
use k to denote individual investment and a to denote individual actions, we use  for the
fundamental, z for the public signal and x for the private signal, and we use  and  for the
precision of public and private information. Finally, we use  to parameterize the degree of
complementarity.
We identify the principles that guide the resolution of each model, and we pinpoint the
underlying assumptions responsible for debates in the literature. We start with the contribu-
tion of Morris and Shin (2000), which illustrates how adding a small amount of (private) noise
to a game with multiple equilibria removes the multiplicity.2 With a unique equilibrium, it
is possible to perform safe comparative-statics analysis which, in turn, assists policy analysis.
We present the detailed proof of the existence of equilibrium, and identify the indi¤erence
threshold conditionas the key condition in the proof of existence.
Atkeson (2000) challenged the approach by Morris and Shin (2000), on the basis that it
would not resist the introduction of prices. If rational individuals can learn about others
private information from asset prices, then the introduction of private noise may not solve
the multiplicity problem. Angeletos and Werning (2006) formally address this issue, setting
the conditions for uniqueness. Angeletos and Werning (2006) consider noncontinuous payo¤
1Actions are strategic complements when the marginal payo¤ of a specic player increases with the actions
of other players.
2We consider normally distributed signals, and this is why we do not present the work by Morris and Shin
(1998). Yet, we do examine the main ideas in their contribution.
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functions, which are useful to model events like speculative attacks and default. As a result of
this assumption, one needs to consider the state threshold conditionin the proof of existence
of equilibrium.
Morris and Shin (2002) introduce two innovations. First, they use payo¤ functions which
penalize extreme actions by individuals, thereby obtaining uniqueness in the perfect informa-
tion case. Second, they assess the normative implications of the theory, and conclude that
more public information may reduce social welfare. Unlike Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos
and Pavan (2004) consider payo¤ functions with complementarities at the social level, and for
which better public information always increases welfare.
Our presentation is self-contained, and it includes the details of the mathematical deriva-
tions - which are often obscure in the original papers. These features make our paper a useful
and unique guide for initial researchers in the eld.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we analyze the role of private and
public information in the determination of equilibrium. In Section 3, we introduce market
prices in the analysis. In Section 4, we assess the impact of information on welfare, when
complementarity is only present at the private level. In Section 5, we perform the same
exercise when there are complementarities at the aggregate level. Section 6 concludes our
analysis.3
2 Rethinking Multiple Equilibria
Morris and Shin (2000), in their paper Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Mod-
elling, examine the theoretical basis underlying the multiple equilibria literature in macroeco-
nomics.
The existence of multiple equilibria derives from two common modeling assumptions.
First, with strategic complementarity, agents wish to coordinate their actions. Second, eco-
nomic fundamentals are common knowledge. Since Nash equilibria and rational expectation
models presume that individuals correctly anticipate each others actions, it follows that
individual actions and beliefs can be perfectly coordinated in a way that creates multiple
equilibria.
Multiplicity is a result of the indeterminacy in beliefs, since any of the equilibrium out-
comes can be supported by a specic set of beliefs. In this context, equilibrium may be
3An appendix with proofs of some results is available at http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/
jjorge/research/appendix2.pdf.
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determined by "sunspots" which dene the set of self-fullling beliefs.
One would expect that strong fundamentals generate optimism which, in turn, causes good
outcomes. Yet, models with "sunspots" do not describe how beliefs are formed, and how they
shift.4 Hence, models with multiple equilibria o¤er no rationale as to why good outcomes
should be correlated with strong fundamentals, as they fail to link economic sentiment with
the strength of the fundamentals.
Morris and Shin (2000) encourage a re-examination of the hypothesis of common knowl-
edge about the economic fundamentals. They remove common knowledge by introducing
noisy private signals which create uncertainty about others actions. Since the actions of
other players are not completely known, there cannot be perfect coordination. Their paper
shows that there is a unique equilibrium when private information is su¢ ciently precise.
Because of uniqueness, it is possible to perform comparative statics analysis and policy
recommendations, which is hard to do in models with multiple equilibria.
Morris and Shin (2000) also address one of the key questions in the literature on nancial
crises. Are crises triggered by fundamentals, or come as a result of panic? They suggest that
weak economic fundamentals are more likely to trigger nancial crises, highlighting the role
of beliefs - economic agents tend to be more pessimistic about others actions when economic
fundamentals are weak.
The paper presents an application to a bank run model, in line with Diamond and Dybvig
(1983)s model.
2.1 The Model
There are three dates t 2 f0; 1; 2g and a continuum of consumers, each endowed with 1 unit
of consumption good. Consumption happens at either date 1 or 2, and there is a measure
1 of patient consumers who may consume on both dates and for whom goods are perfect
substitutes, and a measure  of impatient consumers, who must consume at date 1. Ex ante
(that is, at date 0), the probability of being impatient is given by 1+ , and consumers learn
their type at date 1.
The utility function of impatient consumers is given by uimp (c1) = ln c1, while the utility
of patient consumer is upat (c1 + c2) = ln (c1 + c2). The values c1 and c2 refer to consumption
at t = 1 and t = 2.
4These models often assume that strong fundamentals generate optimism but, theoretically, optimism is
also conceivable with weak fundamentals.
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At date 0, consumers can either store their endowment of the consumption good, or deposit
it in the bank. Those consumers who have deposited their money in the bank at date 0, have
to make a decision when they learn their type: they can leave their money in the bank, or
withdraw.
The bank can invest the funds received at date 0 in cash, or in an illiquid technology
that is only available to the bank. This technology is illiquid because it can be prematurely
liquidated at a cost. The gross rate of return on this technology equals R  e l at date 2. The
parameter R > 1 represents the maximum attainable return and e l represents the cost of
premature liquidation. Variable l represents the proportion of the resources invested in the
illiquid technology which are withdrawn at date 1. Hence 0  l  1.5 Let   lnR, and the
gross rate of return equals e l. Assume 0 <  < 1.6
Optimal Contract. The optimal contract denes the levels of consumption at both
dates. The aim is to maximize the ex ante expected utility 1+uimp (c1)+
1
1+upat (c2), where
we have assumed that patient consumers want to consume in the nal period as it is optimal
to benet from the productive technology. Maximization is subject to the budget constraint
c1 +
c2
R  1 + . The optimal contract denes c1 = 1 and c2 = R.
It can be easily veried that these quantities satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
upat (c1)  upat (c2). Although patient consumers can withdraw 1 unit of good at date 1, they
prefer to get R units of the consumption good at the nal date.
Multiple equilibria. As shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the optimal contract
is vulnerable to bank runs and there are multiple equilibria. At date 1, impatient consumers
have as a dominant strategy to withdraw and patient consumers play a coordination game
with two equilibria.
For patient consumers, the utility of withdrawing at date 1 equals upat (c1) = ln 1 = 0. If
a proportion l of patient consumers withdraw at date 1, the monetary payo¤ associated to
those who leave their money in the bank will be e l and their utility will be    l.
If a patient consumer expects that all other patient consumers do not withdraw, then it
is optimal to maintain its wealth in the bank. In this case, l = 0 and its utility equals  > 0.
If he expects that all other patient consumers withdraw, l = 1, then its utility is    1 < 0.
There is no Nash equilibrium with 0 < l < 1, as some patient consumers would not be
5 It is not very appealing that, if all resources invested in the illiquid technology are liquidated, the return
in date 2 is positive (R  e 1 > 0).
6Alternatively, one could think that the productive technology requires an investment at t = 1, and has a
return equal to e l at the nal date. In this case, 1  l represents the amount of investment it the productive
technology at t = 1. This technology can be seen as having increasing returns to scale.
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playing their best response. Hence, there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium, all patient
consumers maintain their money in the bank and, in the other, they all withdraw.
2.2 The Noisy Signal Eliminates Multiplicity
The next step is to introduce uncertainty regarding the fundamental . It should be noted
that the optimal quantities c1 = 1 and c2 = R derived in the previous section need not be
optimal in the new setup. Nonetheless, Morris and Shin impose the benchmark contract in
the new environment.
Suppose  is a normal random variable with mean  and variance 1=. This distribution
is common knowledge, and this information is called public information. The precision of
public information is given by parameter . Variable  can be represented as
 =  +
1p

" (1)
where " is a standard normal random variable. Let 0 <  < 1, otherwise patient consumers
have a strictly dominant strategy.
The introduction of uncertainty in public information does not change the results signif-
icantly, as we would still have multiple equilibria in this case. The real innovation of this
contribution is the introduction of idiosyncratic uncertainty as follows.
Depositor i observes a noisy private signal xi = + 1p "i, with "i following a standard nor-
mal distribution, independent across investors and independent of  (and "). This information
is called private information and has precision .
At date 1, the patient consumer i observes the private signal xi (in the language of game
theory, this is his type), updates his belief about , and decides if he withdraws or not.
A strategy is a rule of action which denes an action conditional on the observed signal.
A prole of strategies is an equilibrium if, conditional on the available information to each
depositor i, and given the strategies followed by other depositors, the action performed by
each depositor i maximizes his conditional expected utility. In other words, we are looking
for the Bayes Nash equilibrium of an imperfect information game.
For simplicity, assume that if withdrawing yields the same utility as leaving money in
the bank, then the depositor chooses to leave the money in the bank. As the fundamental 
and the signal xi are normally distributed, the depositor is posterior belief about  follows a
normal distribution with mean
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E [jxi] =  + xi
+ 
(2)
and variance
V ar [jxi] = 1
+ 
: (3)
Let i  E [jxi]. The conditional expectation i is a weighted average of  and xi, in which the
weights depend on the precision of public and private information. The conditional variance
is constant and does not depend on the realizations of the fundamental and of the private
signal. The above expressions derive from the following statistical result.
Lemma 1 Let y and x be represented as a bivariate normal distribution"
y
x
#
 N
 "
Ey
Ex
#
;
"
Vy Vyx
Vxy Vx
#!
:
Then E [yjx] = Ey + VyxV x (x  Ex) and V ar [yjx] = Vy  
V 2yx
V x .
In our case,  replaces y, and xi replaces x. The unconditional mean of the signal
xi is , its unconditional variance is 1 +
1
 , and the covariance between xi and  equals
E
 
xi   
  
    = E h + 1p

"i   
  
   i = 1 . Then E [jxi] =  + 11

+ 1

 
xi   

=
+xi
+ and V ar [jxi] = 1 +
1
2
1

+ 1

= 1+ .
Let  (:) be the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and  = 
2(+)
(+2) . There
is a unique equilibrium when  is small enough.
Proposition 1 Provided that   2, there is a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
every patient consumer i withdraws if and only if i < 
 where  is the unique solution to
 = 
 p

 
    : (4)
All patient consumers follow a switching strategy around the threshold . Each patient
consumer will withdraw his money whenever its expectation i falls below the threshold
. Models with common knowledge are characterized by "bang-bang" solutions, in which
all patient consumers take the same decision. This is (generally) not true with imperfect
information. With noisy private signals, some depositors maintain their money at the bank
while others withdraw. There are always ine¢ ciencies in equilibrium because some depositors
make the wrong decisions about withdrawing or not their money.
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The proof of Proposition 1 has two parts - proving uniqueness and showing existence. We
start by showing that the above equilibrium indeed exists.
The indi¤erence threshold condition. A patient consumer whose posterior belief
about  equals  ought to be indi¤erent between leaving his money in the bank and with-
drawing it. The utility from withdrawing is zero, while the utility of leaving money deposited
in the bank equals    l. Hence, the threshold  satises
E [   lj] = 0: (5)
Since i =
+xi
+ , conditioning on i or conditioning on xi is equivalent. Hence, E [   lj] =
E [j]   E [lj] =    E [lj]. It remains to check the value of E [lj]. The noise "i is
independent of  and, as a result, the expected proportion of patient consumers who withdraw
is equal to the probability that any particular patient consumer withdraws. Hence, E [lj] =
prob

j < 
j, since every patient consumer follows a switching strategy around .
As an intermediate step, we compute the probability that depositor i attaches to some
other depositor j having a posterior belief j lower than himself, that is prob

j < iji

. Since
conditioning on i or conditioning on xi is equivalent, then the posterior distribution of the
fundamental  is normal with mean and variance given by (2) and (3). Moreover, j < i ,
+xj
+ < i , xj < i+
 
i   

. Hence, prob

j < iji

= prob
h
xj < i +


 
i   
 jii.
Since xj =  + 1p "j , the distribution of xj conditional on i is normal with mean i
and precision (+)+2 . This is because, according to Lemma 1, E [xj ji] = E [xj jxi] =
 +
Cov[xi;xj ]
V ar[xi]
 
xi   

=  +
1

1

+ 1

 
xi   

= i and V ar [xj ji] = V ar [xj jxi] = V ar[xj ]  
Cov2[xi;xj ]
V ar[xi]
=

1
 +
1


  (
1
)
2
1

+ 1

= +2(+) . Hence, we can compute prob

j < iji

as
prob
h
xj < i +


 
i   
 jii =
prob
"
xj iq
+2
(+)
<
i+

 (i ) iq
+2
(+)
ji
#
=
= 
q
(+)
+2


 
i   

= 
 p

 
i   

.
We are now ready to compute E [lj]. For an individual with expectation , we have
E [lj] =   p     . We can go back to equation (5) and substitute the results obtained
so far , and get      p      = 0. The value  is the point at which the line

 p

 
   crosses the 45o degrees line, and this point always exists. Hence, equilibrium
always exists.
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Uniqueness. The slope of 
 p

 
   equals p  p    , where  (:) is the
density of the standard normal distribution function. Since the maximum value of the density
function is 1p
2
, the slope of 
 p

 
   is inferior or equal to q 2 . Since   2, there
can be at most one point of intersection.
Hence, there is one single equilibrium in the class of switching strategies. Yet, there
may exist other equilibria in other classes of strategies. Following Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), Morris and Shin (2000) show that the proposed equilibrium is the only one to survive
the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. This makes their argument quite strong,
as this equilibrium concept is stronger than the denition of Nash Equilibrium. We do not
show their argument here, as the proof of uniqueness is fairly clear in the original paper.
The precision of private information. To obtain a unique equilibrium, private in-
formation must be su¢ ciently precise, so that parameter  is low enough. When private
information is su¢ ciently precise, there is enough diversity in beliefs such that individuals
decide based on their own private signals, and are unable to coordinate their actions.
When public information is too precise ( is high) we are in a situation akin to the
traditional case without private information. The traditional case can be seen as the extreme
case in which the relative precision of public information is innitely high (even though the
absolute precision of public information might be low). In the traditional case, all information
is common knowledge and public information allows agents to coordinate their actions and
beliefs in a way which invites multiplicity of equilibria. The same happens when private
information is imprecise.
Morris and Shin did not provide an interpretation for private information. Later, Angeletos
and Pavan (2004) remarked that the private signal xi introduces idiosyncratic variation in
market expectations about the fundamentals, and thus can be interpreted as heterogeneity in
the ltering and interpretation of publicly available information.
2.3 Comparative statics and policy analysis
Unlike models with multiple equilibria, it is possible to perform secure comparative statics
analysis in models with a unique equilibrium. As a result, in these models it is possible to
make sound policy recommendations. More specically, Morris and Shin (2000) study the
implementation of an early-withdrawal penalty t imposed on consumers who withdraw at
date 1.
Morris and Shin (2000) apply a technique that has become popular in the literature, and
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which serves two purposes. First, it simplies the mathematical derivations and allows one
to measure results easily. Second, it allows one to compare directly the certainty case with
the uncertainty case. They focus on what happens in the limit when the private signals of
depositors become very precise, and noise becomes negligible. This corresponds to the case
where  ! 1, in which case depositors know the realization of the fundamental  because
xi !  and i ! . In this case  ! 0, and from expression (4) we obtain  = 12 .
This result may seem surprising. Although there is (almost) certainty about the funda-
mental , all patient consumers withdraw their money from the bank when 0 <  < 12 , even if
they would be better by not doing so. Despite (almost) perfect information, they are unable
to coordinate their decisions. The key to understanding this result is to note that strategic
uncertainty (that is, uncertainty about othersactions) is not resolved even when the private
signal becomes very precise. Private noise destroys common knowledge, thereby preventing
coordination.
The case in which noise becomes negligible can be seen as a small perturbation of the
certainty case. The lesson is clear. Multiplicity of equilibria in the original bank run game
does not resist the introduction of an arbitrarily small amount of noise.
Going back to the analysis of the implementation of an early-withdrawal penalty, it im-
plies that withdrawal at date 1 yields utility ln (1  t) and expression (5) would become
E [   lj] = ln (1  t). This implies that the new critical threshold would be  = 12 +
ln (1  t). As the new threshold is lower than 12 , the penalty increases e¢ ciency for those
states in which  2 12 + ln (1  t) ; 12.
2.4 Observable implications
The model also has testable implications. First, each patient consumer will withdraw his
money whenever its expectation i falls below the threshold 
. Since private signals are
positively correlated with the realization of the fundamental , the size of the bank run
will be negatively correlated with the value of the fundamental. The incidence of early-
withdrawals among patient consumers is given by l, and depends on the realization of the
fundamental. A patient consumer i withdraws whenever +xi+ < 
. Rearranging terms,
he will withdraw whenever its private signal falls below a threshold x, that is whenever
xi < x
  +     . Since xi = + 1p "i, the probability that patient consumer i
withdraws conditional on the realization of the fundamental  is equal to prob [xi < xj] =
prob

xi 
1p

< x
 
1p

j

= 
 p
 (x   ). With a continuum of patient consumers, the law of
large numbers allows us to treat aggregate variables as deterministic. Hence, the incidence of
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withdrawals by patient consumers conditional on the realization of the fundamental  is equal
to l () = prob [xi < xj] = 
 p
 (x   ). Clearly, the incidence of early-withdrawals is
high when the realization of the fundamental  is low.
Second, a shift in the expected realization , implies a shift in the threshold . To see
this, apply the implicit function theorem to expression (5) to get @

@
< 0.
When public information states that economic fundamentals are weak (as measured by
), the threshold  will be high and the incidence of early-withdrawals l () increases for all
realizations of .
3 Crises and Prices
In the previous analysis, individuals have no information other than the prior distribution of
 and their own private signal to consider when they decide whether to withdraw or not.7
Atkeson (2000) points out that this would change if one introduced markets and prices into
the model.
Rational individuals can learn about othersprivate information from asset prices. Con-
sider the existence of bank equity being traded before depositors take their decisions. This
asset should be priced in equilibrium in a way that accurately reects its subsequent return.
The price of bank equity should reveal the incidence of early-withdrawls, since the value of l
is pinned down in equilibrium. Bank equity will have a low price when the fundamental  is
low (and most depositors withdraw their money from the bank), and a high price when  is
high. Hence, the price reveals the state of the world  and, as a result, we obtain multiple
equilibria.
Angeletos and Werning (2006), in their paper Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation,
Multiplicity and Volatility, address the informational role of prices in the context of global
games. They introduce a nancial market in a coordination game. Prices aggregate dispersed
private information, and act as an endogenous public signal about the economic fundamental.
The precision of endogenous public information increases with the precision of exogenous
private information and, as result, lower levels of private noise do not necessarily contribute
towards uniqueness.
In their paper, Angeletos and Werning (2006) revisit the model of currency crises by Morris
7Hence, individuals cannot observe the queues forming in front of a bank, as this would give them an idea
about the value of l.
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and Shin (1998). Yet, it is also possible to reinterpret their model as a model of bank runs.
3.1 The Model
There is a continuum of agents i 2 [0; 1], and each agent can choose between two actions,
either attack ai = 1, or not attack ai = 0. The attack action replaces the withdraw action in
Morris and Shin (2000).
The payo¤ from not attacking is normalized to zero. The payo¤ from attacking is 1  c if
the the status quo is abandoned (that is, the attack succeeds), and  c otherwise. The value
of c 2 (0; 1) parametrizes the cost of attacking.
The attack succeeds if and only if A > , where A represents the mass of agents attacking
and  denotes the strength of the status quo. Hence, the payo¤ function can be represented
as:
u (ai; A; ) =
8><>:
1  c if ai = 1 and A > 
 c if ai = 1 and A  
0 if ai = 0:
This is a coordination game because u (1; A; )   u (0; A; ) increases with A, so that the
incentives to attack increase with the mass of agents attacking.
Exogenous public information Angeletos and Werning (2006) start by assuming that
public information about the economic fundamental  is exogenous. Individuals have a com-
mon prior about  which follows a uniform distribution over the entire real line. Agents receive
an exogenous public signal z =  + 1p

" where " is a standard normal random variable. Put
di¤erently, we can rewrite this expression as  = z   1p

", which is similar to expression (1)
with z replacing the mean . It follows that the denition of exogenous public information in
Angeletos and Werning (2006) is equivalent to the denition of public information in Morris
and Shin (2000).
Like in Morris and Shin (2000), each individual i observes a private signal xi =  + 1p "i,
where "i is standard normal, independent and identically distributed across individuals, and
independent of ". It is easy to show that E [jxi] = z+xi+ and V ar [jxi] = 1+ .
The denition of equilibrium is very similar to Morris and Shin (2000). Yet, the results
di¤er in dimensions that are worth mentioning.
Proposition 2 In the game with exogenous information, the equilibrium is unique if and only
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if private noise is small relative to public noise, so that p

 p2.
For su¢ ciently precise private information ( large enough) we obtain uniqueness. An-
geletos and Werning (2006) focus on switching strategies in which the individual attacks if
and only if his private signal xi is lower than a threshold x. It is straightforward to derive
the equilibrium in terms of switching strategies around a threshold  (as Morris and Shin,
2000 did), given the equivalence between the signal xi and the posterior i.
To prove the existence of equilibrium, two conditions are needed: the indi¤erence threshold
condition and the state threshold condition. We start with the latter.
The state threshold condition. The status quo is about to change when A = , where
A is the mass of attackers who have received a signal below the marginal signal x. Given that
there is a continuum of individuals, A is equal to the probability that an individual receives a
signal lower than x. Denote by  the critical state  which separates those states in which
the status quo is abandoned from those states in which it is not, that is A = . When  = ,
the distribution of xi is normal with mean  and precision . Hence, A = 
 p
 (x   ).
Since A = , we obtain

p
 (x   )

=  , x =  + 
 1 ()p

. (6)
The indi¤erence threshold condition. Angeletos and Werning (2006) derive the in-
di¤erence threshold condition in terms of the private signal xi (and not in terms of the
posterior i, as Morris and Shin, 2000 did). At the critical threshold x
, the individual is
indi¤erent between attacking and not attacking. Not attacking yields zero, while the in-
dividuals expected payo¤ from attacking depends on the subjective probability that the
status quo is abandoned, as well as on the returns when the attack succeeds and does
not succeed. Since the attack succeeds whenever  < , individual i attacks whenever
prob [ < jxi] (1  c) + prob [  jxi] ( c) > 0. Individual i believes that  has a normal
distribution with mean z+xi+ and precision +. Hence, the probability that individual i at-
tributes to a change in the status quo is equal to prob [ < jxi] = 
p
+ 

   z+xi+

.
For the marginal individual who is indi¤erent between attacking or not,

p
+ 

   z + xi
+ 

(1  c)
 

1  
p
+ 

   z + xi
+ 

c = 0
This indi¤erence condition applies for an individual with a signal equal to x, and can be
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rewritten as
   z + x

+ 
=
 1 (c)p
+ 
(7)
Critical value of . Equilibrium is identied with the joint solution to the threshold con-
ditions (6) and (7). Substituting (6) into (7) yields  = 

p


 
p
+
 
 1 (c) + (   z)

or, equivalently,
 = 

p

p
+ 

 1 (1  c) + (   z)

(8)
because  (1  c) =   (c). Equation (8) has a unique solution, if the expression in the right
hand side has slope less than one everywhere. Since the slope of the cumulative standard
normal distribution is given by the corresponding density function (which is always inferior
to 1p
2
), a su¢ cient condition for a unique solution for  is given by p

 p2.
Di¤erences between the Morris and Shin (2000) and Angeletos and Werning
(2006) models. The main di¤erence is the denition of the payo¤ functions. In Morris and
Shin (2000) the payo¤ on the bank deposit depends on the incidence of early withdrawals
(and is, thus, a continuous variable), whereas in Angeletos and Werning (2006) the payo¤
depends on whether the status quo is abandoned or not (and is, thus, a discrete variable).
This di¤erence has two important consequences for the proof of existence of equilibrium.
On the one hand, obtaining the indi¤erence threshold condition is considerably more chal-
lenging in the Morris and Shin (2000) setup. On the other hand, one must estimate the state
threshold condition in the Angeletos and Werning (2006) framework.
3.2 Prices as endogenous sources of public information
Assume there is a nancial market in which agents trade an asset prior to playing the coordi-
nation game. The return on this asset depends on the fundamental , and individuals trade
based on their private signals. As a result, the equilibrium price will convey information that
is useful in the coordination game.
The fundamental  is drawn from a uniform distribution over the real line, and each
individual i receives the exogenous private signal xi. For tractability reasons we separate the
coordination game from the trading in the nancial market. Despite having two stages, the
game is not dynamic from the strategic point of view, and agents can be seen as interacting
in two separate stages.
In the rst stage, individuals trade the risky asset at price p. For simplicity assume
that the assets return equals . We adopt the CARA-normal framework introduced by
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Grossman and Stiglitz (1976). The utility of individual i is V (wi) =  e wi for  > 0,
where wi = w0 + (   p) ki is the nal wealth, w0 is the initial endowment, and ki 2 R is
investment in the risky asset. The supply of the asset is uncertain and not observed, given by
KS ("s) = s"s, with s > 0, and "s is a standard normal random variable, independent of
, ", and the private noise "i. This formulation means that the risky asset exists in zero net
supply plus some noise - parametrized by s - which prevents a fully revealing equilibrium.
The second stage is essentially the same as the model in Section 3.1. Individuals decide
whether to attack or not, the status quo changes if A > , and the payo¤s equal u (ai; A; ).
There is an important di¤erence in the second stage with respect to the model in Section 3.1.
Individuals observe the price that cleared the nancial market, and the endogenous price p
replaces the exogenous public signal z. The eventual change in the status quo, the assets
return and the payo¤s from both stages are realized at the end of the second stage.
Individual demand of the risky asset k (x; p) is a function of x and p, the realizations of the
private and public signals; aggregate demand K (; p) is a function of  and p. The individual
decision to attack or not a (x; p) is a function of x and p; the mass of agents attacking A (; ; p)
is a function of  and p. The equilibrium price depends on the realizations of the fundamental
 and "s; dene the equilibrium price function as P (; "s).
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a price function P (; "s), individual strategies for investment
in the risky asset k (x; p), and individual strategies about whether to attack or not a (x; p), such
that:
k (x; p) 2 arg maxk2RE [V (w0 + (   p) k) jx; p];
K (; p) = E [k (x; p) j; p];
P = P (; "s) is the solution to K (; P ) = KS ("s);
a (x; p) 2 arg maxa2f0;1gE [u (a;A (; p) ; ) jx; p];
A (; p) = E [a (x; p) j; p];
and the status quo is abandoned if and only if A (; P ) > .
The above conditions dene, respectively, the individual demand, the aggregate demand,
and the market clearing for the risky asset, the individual attack strategy, and the mass of
agents attacking. These conditions dene a rational expectations competitive equilibrium for
the rst stage, and a Bayesian equilibrium for the second stage.
Equilibrium. In the rst stage, we guess a linear price function. Observing the price
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realization then is equivalent to observing a normally distributed signal with some precision
p > 0. The posterior of  conditional on x and p is normally distributed with mean
pp+xi
p+
and precision p +. Individuals choose the amount of the risky asset which maximizes their
expected utility E [V (wi) jxi; p] = E [ e wi jxi; p] = E
 e w0 ( p)ki jxi; p. In order to
proceed, the following statistical result is needed.
Lemma 2 (Moment-generating function of a normal random variable). When t is a
constant and y has a normal distribution with mean  and variance , then E

ety

= et+
t2
2
 .
Applying the above result, we obtain E [V (wi) jxi; p] = E
 e w0 ( p)ki jxi; p =
E

 e w0 

pp+xi
p+
 p

ki+
2
2
k2i
1
p+ jxi; p

. Hence
max
fkig
E [V (wi) jxi; p] = maxfkig

pp+ xi
p + 
  p

ki   
2
k2i
1
p + 
.
The rst order condition yields an individual asset demand equal to k (x; p) =  (x  p).
The aggregate demand of the risky asset equals K (; p) = E [k (x; p) j; p] =  (   p). The
market clearing condition implies P (; "s) =    s "s, which veries the initial guess with
p =


s
2
. This result highlights the informative role of prices because the precision of
public information improves with private information.
The second stage is equivalent to the benchmark model in the previous section, with the
price p playing the role of the public signal z. Replace  with p, and the uniqueness condition
becomes pp

 p2 ,
p
3
22s
 p2. Hence we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the game with endogenous information, the equilibrium is unique if and
only if
p
3
22s
 p2.
In contrast with the exogenous information case expressed in Proposition 2, too precise
private information implies the existence of multiple equilibria. The introduction of a nancial
market implies that better private information (i.e. large ) also improves the precision
of public information at a faster rate, su¢ cient to ensure multiple equilibria. Yet, if the
uncertainty s associated with the supply of the risky asset is large enough, then the price is
not su¢ ciently informative. In this case, individuals do not use the public signal coordinate
their actions and we obtain a unique equilibrium.
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3.2.1 Endogenous returns and price multiplicity
Motivated by the fact that crises a¤ect asset market returns, Angeletos and Werning (2006)
consider the case in which the risky assets return is endogenously determined by the coordi-
nation game. The novel result is that multiplicity can also emerge in the nancial price.
If the return in the rst stage is endogenously determined by the coordination game, the
overall e¤ect of prices becomes more complex. A higher price realization in the rst stage
indicates a high realization of the fundamental , thereby making individuals less willing to
attack in the coordination game. If a smaller attack raises the return on the asset traded
in the rst stage, then the demand for the asset can increase with its price and there is a
backward-bending demand curve. With a backward-bending demand curve, it is possible to
obtain multiple market clearing prices.
3.3 Applications
Morris and Shin (2004), in their paper Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt, apply the
results obtained so far to study the coordination problem of creditors facing a borrower in
distress. Creditors of a distressed rm face the same problem as depositors facing a bank
run, and Morris and Shin (2004) explore the idea of solvent but illiquid borrowers as they
had explored the idea of solvent but illiquid banks. The hypothesis is that the coordination
problem impacts on the price of defaultable debt.
Morris and Shin (2006), in their paper Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?, study the
e¤ects of lending by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the context of sovereign debt
crises. They argue that the provision of o¢ cial assistance to a sovereign with limited access
to nancial markets stimulates the private sector creditors into rolling over short term loans,
thereby alleviating the funding crisis faced by the debtor country. Liquidity provision by an
o¢ cial institution like the IMF can work to prevent a destructive run by moving the critical
threshold .
There are lessons to take from their methodological approach, as they use a dynamic
model in which the sovereign, the IMF, and the individual short term investors move se-
quentially. Morris and Shin (2006) can easily solve this dynamic problem because short term
investors move in the last stage. By applying backward induction, they can solve the global
game component by taking the actions taken by the IMF and the sovereign government as
exogenous.
Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2006), in their paper International Lending of Last
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Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMFs Catalytic Finance, study a problem similar to
Morris and Shin (2006) but adopt a di¤erent analytical framework. They consider a global
game in which all players move simultaneously, and the IMF is a large player relative to
the other creditors. The IMF then conditions the nature of the strategic interactions of the
creditors, thereby a¤ecting critical threshold .
4 Social Value of Public Information
In their paper Social Value of Public Information, Morris and Shin (2002) address two main
issues: one methodological and one substantive. From a substantive viewpoint, they move
beyond the study of the positive (or descriptive) implications of the theory, and consider the
normative (or prescriptive) implications. Specically, they assess the welfare implications of
more precise information and nd the best quantity of information.
Methodologically, Morris and Shin (2002) consider a combination of continuous strategy
spaces and payo¤ functions for which there is a large cost associated with undertaking extreme
actions. As a result, there is a unique equilibrium, even in the perfect information case.8 This
framework is well-suited to analyze problems for which multiplicity of equilibria is not an
issue.
The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) is that, under some conditions, more public
information is bad for social welfare. Yet, Svensson (2006) argues that this is unlikely to be
the case for reasonable parameters.
4.1 The Model
There is a continuum of individuals, indexed by i, and uniformly distributed over the interval
[0; 1]. Each individual i chooses an action ai 2 R, with a representing the action prole of all
individuals. Individual is payo¤ function is
ui (a; ) =  
h
(1  ) (ai   )2 + 
 
Li   L
i
where  is the fundamental (the underlying state),  is a constant with 0 <  < 1, and
Li =
R 1
0 (aj   ai)2 dj and L =
R 1
0 Ljdj. Function Lj measures the average distance between
is action and the action prole of the whole population, while L is an average of the average
8Formally, Morris and Shin (2002) consider a utility function which generates a linear rst order condition
in the individual maximization problem. There is a unique optimal decision for each individual, which depends
on his individual information.
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individual distances.
According to the above payo¤ function, individual i has two objectives. First, he wishes
to take an action which is as close as possible to the underlying state ; the rst component
of the payo¤ function is a quadratic loss in the distance between the fundamental  and his
action ai.
Second, he wishes to take an action which is as close as possible to the actions of the other
individuals (that is, he wants to set a low value for Li). The term L standardizes the value
of Li; setting ai very di¤erent from the actions of the whole population is not so detrimental
for his utility, if everybody else makes the same mistake (that is, L is high). The second term
in the payo¤ function is the Keynesian "beauty contest" component, which creates incentives
for individuals to second-guess the actions of others. The parameter  gives the weight on
this second-guessing motive.
The social welfare is dened as the (normalized) average of individual utilities
W (a; ) =
1
1  
Z 1
0
ui (a; ) di =   1
1  
Z 1
0
h
(1  ) (ai   )2 + 
 
Li   L
i
di
=  
Z 1
0
(ai   )2 di. (9)
Thus, the social planner wants to minimize the distance between agents actions and the
economic fundamental .
The second-guess motive does not inuence social welfare, since
R 1
0
 
Li   L

di = 0.
Second-guessing has a zero-sum nature, as winners gain at the expense of the losers. But, since
it inuences individual decisions, the second-guessing motive creates a negative externality.
To see this, consider the rst order condition of individual i, @E[ui(a;)]@ai = 0,
Ei
h
 2 (1  ) (ai   )  

@Li
@ai
  @L@ai
i
= 0, where Ei [:] is the expectation conditional
on the information of individual i.
Individual i is innitesimal and takes L as a constant, so that @L@ai = 0.
Hence, Ei
h
  (1  ) (ai   ) + 
R 1
0 (aj   ai) dj
i
= 0.
Dene a =
R 1
0 ajdj as the average action in the population, and we obtain
ai = (1  )Ei [] + Ei [a] . (10)
Hence, individual actions depend on the expected fundamental and on the expected actions
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of others.
The certainty case. When individuals know the value of the fundamental , the equi-
librium is unique and entails ai =  for all i.9 Social welfare is maximized at equilibrium.
Unlike in previous models, there is a unique (symmetric) equilibrium in the perfect in-
formation case. This is because of the way in which the authors design the payo¤ function
ui (a; ). There is a large cost associated with undertaking extreme actions, like ai !  1
or ai ! +1, and all agents prefer to take "intermediate" actions. This feature prevents
"bang-bang" solutions.
Equilibrium with public signals and perfect information. Morris and Shin (2002)
consider the case where individuals face uncertainty and have access to exogenous public
information which is common knowledge. Individuals have a common prior about  which
follows a uniform distribution over the entire real line. Individuals receive an exogenous public
signal z = + 1p

" where " is a standard normal random variable. Conditional on the public
signal z, the fundamental  has a normal distribution with mean z and precision , that is,
 = z   1p

". Using equation (10), we obtain a unique equilibrium given by ai (z) = z, since
Ei [] = E [jz] = z and Ei [a] = E [ajz] = E
hR 1
0 aj (z) djjz
i
= E
hR 1
0 z djjz
i
= z. Conditional
on the fundamental , the expected social welfare is equal to
E [W (a; ) j] = E

 
Z 1
0
(z   )2 dij

=  
Z 1
0
E
h
(z   )2 j
i
di =   1

.
Hence, more precise information raises social welfare.
4.2 Equilibrium with private and public signals
Morris and Shin (2002) consider the information structure with exogenous public information
and private signals that we have studied in Section 3.1. More specically, each individual
also receives a private signal xi =  + 1p "i, where "i is a standard normal random variable,
independent and identically distributed across individuals, and independent of ". Under this
setup we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 There is a unique equilibrium, given by ai =
z+(1 )xi
+(1 ) .
Individual actions depend on the available information. In the certainty case, individual
actions equal the known fundamental. In the perfect information case, actions equal the
9 It is easy to prove this statement by contradiction. If there was an equilibrium with ai 6= , individual i
would want to set his action a little bit closer to .
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public signal, which is the best available information about the fundamental. In the imperfect
information case, individual actions are a weighted average of the two pieces of information
received. But, in this case, individual actions are di¤erent from the best estimate of the
fundamental (this would be ai =
z+xi
+ ). This happens because of the second-guessing
motive.
In the certainty and in the perfect information cases, individuals second-guess others
decisions correctly, so that the "beauty contest" term does not interfere with the individual
optimal decision. All individuals end up choosing the same action, and Li   L = 0. This
is no longer true in the imperfect information case. With private signals, individual actions
are di¤erent across agents (so that Li   L 6= 0) and the second-guessing motive inuences
individual decisions. The individual decision becomes ai =
z+(1 )xi
+(1 ) and, since the weight
of the second-guessing motive is given by , it is easy to see that the weight of the second-
guessing motive reduces the importance of private information xi on individual decisions.
Second-guessing implies that individuals give more weight to public information than to
private information. As a result, there is a disproportionate inuence of the public signal z in
inuencing the individualsactions. The magnitude of this e¤ect is greater when  is large.
In order to prove the existence of equilibrium, we guess that all individuals follow a linear
strategy
ai (z; xi) = xi + (1  ) z; (11)
where  is a constant. Then, Ei [a] = E [ajz; xi] = E
hR 1
0 aj (z) djjz; xi
i
=
= E
hR 1
0 (xj + (1  ) z) djjz; xi
i
= 
R 1
0 E [xj jz; xi] dj + (1  ) z, and
E [xj jz; xi] = z+xi+ , so that Ei [a] = z+xi+ + (1  ) z = +xi +

1  +

. Then, indi-
vidual is optimal action follows from (10), so that ai (z; xi) = (1  ) z+xi+ +
h

+xi +

1  +
i
and
ai (z; xi) =
 (+ 1  )
+ 
xi +

1   (+ 1  )
+ 

z: (12)
Combining (11) and (12), we obtain  = (+1 )+ ,  = (1 )(1 )+ . Hence, ai = z+(1 )xi+(1 ) ,
which conrms our initial guess.
4.2.1 Welfare implications
We are ready to answer a fundamental question. Is welfare increasing in the precision  of
public information? The answer is: it depends. From the solution for ai in Proposition 4, and
the denitions of the signals z and xi, we obtain ai = +
p
"+
p
(1 )"i
+(1 ) . For a given state ,
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the expected welfare is equal to
E[W (a; ) j] = E

 
Z 1
0
(ai   )2 dij

=  E
"Z 1
0
p
"+
p
 (1  ) "i
+  (1  )
2
dij
#
=   +  (1  )
2
[+  (1  )]2 . (13)
By examining (13), we can assess the e¤ects of increasing the precision of public information
and private information. First, welfare is always increasing in the precision of the private
signals. It is easy to check that @E[W (a;)j]@ > 0.
Second, the e¤ect of the precision of public information on welfare is ambiguous because
@E[W (a;)j]
@ =
 (2 1)(1 )
[+(1 )]3 . Since + (1  ) > 0, welfare is increasing in the precision of
the public signal if and only if @E[W (a;)j]@  0,   (2  1) (1  )  0, that is


 1
(2  1) (1  ) : (14)
When  < 0:5, the above condition is trivially satised since  and  are positive. But when
 > 0:5, there are parameter values for which the increased precision of public information is
detrimental to welfare. When the coordination motive is very important ( is large), better
public information may be harmful.
It is instructive to compare these results with the case in which there is no Keynesian
"beauty contest" component. In this last case,  = 0 and from (13) we obtain E[W (a; ) j] =
  1+ . In this case, better private and public information is always benecial for welfare.
Svenssons Critique. The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) has often been in-
terpreted as an anti-transparency result. Svensson (2006) challenges this view, arguing that
only under very specic conditions more transparency can have a negative impact. He per-
forms sensitivity analysis using Morris and Shin (2002)s model, and concludes that condition
(14) is very likely to be satised under reasonable assumptions. Hence, more transparency is
generally good for social welfare.
5 Transparency of Information and Investment Complemen-
tarities
Angeletos and Pavan (2004), in their paper Transparency of Information and Coordination
Economies with Investment Complementarities, explore how the precision of public and pri-
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vate information impacts on equilibrium allocations and social welfare. Unlike Morris and
Shin (2002), they nd that social welfare always increases with the precision of public infor-
mation (interestingly, they nd that the precision of private information has an ambiguous
e¤ect on welfare).
In this section, we return to an environment with strategic complementarities at the social
level, that we have already analyzed in the bank run game and in Angeletos and Werning
(2006). This environment is useful to analyze economies with production externalities, and
models with macroeconomic complementarities.
Methodologically, Angeletos and Pavan (2004) introduce an elegant and tractable payo¤
function so as to obtain a unique equilibrium. They consider increasing investment costs,
which prevents extreme actions by individuals and "bang-bang" solutions.
5.1 The Model
There is a continuum of individuals represented by the interval [0; 1]. Individual is payo¤
function is
u (ki; A) = Aki   1
2
k2i (15)
where ki 2 R represents individual investment. This assumption is important for uniqueness
because, rst, ki a continuous variable and, second, there are large costs associated with under-
taking extreme actions, like ki !  1 or ki ! +1, and all individuals prefer "intermediate"
levels on investment. Aggregate investment equals K =
R 1
0 kidi.
There is complementarity at the social level because the individual return A is increasing
in the aggregate level of investment K, as
A = (1  )  + K
where  represents the exogenous return to investment (that is, the underlying fundamental),
and parameter  2 0; 12 measures the degree of complementarity.
Social welfare is given by W (k; ) =
R 1
0 u (ki; A) di. Using expression (15) we obtain
W (k; ) = AK   1
2
Z 1
0
k2i di;
where k represents the prole of investment for all individuals. Adding and subtracting
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1
2
R 1
0 K
2   2kiKdi, yields
W (k; ) = AK +
1
2
Z 1
0
 
K2   2kiK

di  1
2
Z 1
0
 
k2i   2kiK +K2

di
= AK   1
2
K2   1
2
var (16)
where var =
R 1
0 (ki  K)2 di measures the cross-sectional heterogeneity in investment. Unlike
Morris and Shin (2002), the social planner cares about reducing heterogeneity in individual
actions.
The structure of information is as in Morris and Shin (2002). The common prior about
 is uniform over R, there is a public signal z =  + 1p

" and a private signal xi =  + 1p "i
where " and "i have the same properties as before. Under the current framework, we obtain
the following result (similar to Proposition 4).
Proposition 5 There is a unique equilibrium, given by ki =
(1 )
+(1 )xi +

1  (1 )+(1 )

z.
5.2 Welfare implications
Consider social welfare evaluated at equilibrium. Expression (16) can be rewritten as
W (k; ) = (1  ) K   (1  2) 1
2
K2   1
2
var:
In the next result, we relate welfare with the precision of information.
Proposition 6 Expected welfare conditional on the realization of the fundamental  equals
E [W (k; ) j] = 122   12 (1 2)+(1 )
2
[+(1 )]2 :
In contrast with Morris and Shin (2002), more precise public information necessarily in-
creases welfare, because @E[W (;z)j]@ =
1
2
(1 2)+(1 )(1+2)
[+(1 )]3 > 0. More precise private infor-
mation has an ambiguous e¤ect on welfare.
The di¤erence in the results stems from an important distinction in the two models. In
Morris and Shin (2000), the social planner seeks to keep all agents actions close to the
fundamental , and does not care about reducing heterogeneity in individual actions - as
shown in expression (9). Any attempts to align individual actions are socially wasteful. Yet,
individuals value more e¤ective coordination, because of the "beauty contest" component of
their utility function. Individuals use public information to second-guess what others will do,
and this creates negative externalities as individuals overreactto public information.
24
Angeletos and Pavan (2004) consider a setup in which the strategic complementarities
are present at the social level, so that the social planner cares about coordinating individual
investment choices - as shown in expression (16). Individuals use public information to align
their actions, and more transparent public information allows more e¤ective coordination,
thereby increasing welfare.
6 Conclusion
We reviewed inuential applications of global games to macroeconomics and nance. We
collected in a single paper the most relevant contributions in the eld, and we identied the
main areas of debate in the literature. For a more advanced treatment of global games, see the
contribution by Morris and Shin (2003) in which the authors examine in detail the theoretical
underpinnings of global games.
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A Appendix
This document is an electronic appendix to the paper A Primer on Global Games Applied to
Macroeconomic and Finance by José Jorge and Joana Rocha.
This appendix has been refereed with the text. However, no attempt has been made to
impose a uniform editorial style on this appendix. This appendix contains proofs of some
results in the paper.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4
It remains to show the uniqueness of equilibrium. From condition (10),
ai = (1  )E [jz; xi] + E [ajz; xi]
= (1  )E [jz; xi] + E
Z 1
0
aj djjz; xi

= (1  )E [jz; xi] + E
Z 1
0
(1  )E [jz; xj ] + E [ajz; xj ] djjz; xi

= (1  )E [jz; xi] +  (1  )
Z 1
0
E [E [jz; xj ] jz; xi] dj + 2
Z 1
0
E [E [ajz; xj ] jz; xi] dj

= (1  )E [jz; xi] +  (1  )E [E [jz; xj ] jz; xi] + 2E [E [ajz; xj ] jz; xi] :
Iterating one more time,
ai = (1  )E [jz; xi] +  (1  )E [E [jz; xj ] jz; xi] + 2E

E
Z 1
0
adjz; xj

jz; xi

= (1  )E [jz; xi] +  (1  )E [E [jz; xj ] jz; xi] +
+2E

E
Z 1
0
(1  )E [jz; x] + E [ajz; x] djz; xj

jz; xi

= (1  )E [jz; xi] +  (1  )E [E [jz; xj ] jz; xi] +
+2 (1  )E [E [E [jz; x] jz; xj ] jz; xi] + 3E [E [E [ajz; x] jz; xj ] jz; xi] .
Hence, from recursive substitution, we obtain
ai = (1  )E [jz; xi]+ (1  )E [E [jz; xj ] jz; xi]+2 (1  )E [E [E [jz; x] jz; xj ] jz; xi]+:::
(17)
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with the last order term converging to zero as the number of terms converge to innity. Morris
and Shin (2002) prove a Lemma, in which they show the following pattern:
E [jz; xi] =

1  
+ 

z +

+ 
xi
E [E [jz; xj ] jz; xi] =
"
1 


+ 
2#
z +


+ 
2
xi
E [E [E [jz; x] jz; xj ] jz; xi] =
"
1 


+ 
3#
z +


+ 
3
xi
and so forth. These expressions allow to rewrite (17) as a series
ai = (1 + )
1X
=0


1 


+ 

z +


+ 

xi
which converges to ai =
z+(1 )xi
+(1 ) .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
We only show the existence of equilibrium. Each individual i wants to maximize its expected
utility E [u (ki; A) jz; xi]. The rst order condition with respect to ki yields
ki = E [Ajz; xi] = (1  )E [jz; xi] + E [Kjz; xi] :
The expectation operator is a linear operator and, as result, ki is a linear function of xi and z.
We guess that ki = %xxi+%zz, where %x and %z are constants to be determined in equilibrium.
Then,
K =
Z 1
0
ki di =
Z 1
0
(%xxi + %zz) di = %x + %zz
and
ki = (1  )E [jz; xi] + E [%x + %zzjz; xi]
= (1  ) z + xi
+ 
+ 

%x
z + xi
+ 
+ %zz

=

+ 
(1  + %x)xi +

(1  + %x)

+ 
+ %z

z:
The initial guess is veried with %x =

+ (1  + %x) and %z = (1  + %x) + + %z,
which implies %x =
(1 )
+(1 ) and %z = 1  %x. 
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Since W (k; ) = (1  ) K   (1  2) 12K2   12var, expected welfare conditional on the
realization of the fundamental  equals
E [W (k; ) j] = (1  ) E [Kj]  (1  2) 1
2
E

K2j  1
2
V ar [kij] ; (18)
where
V ar [kij] = E
Z 1
0
(ki  K)2 dij

= E
Z 1
0
[%xxi + %zz   (%x + %zz)]2 dij

= %2xE
Z 1
0
(xi   )2 dij

=
%2x

is the equilibrium value of heterogeneity. Moreover,
E [Kj] = E
Z 1
0
ki dij

= E
Z 1
0
(%xxi + %zz) dij

= 
and, by the denition of variance,
E

K2j = V ar [Kj] + (E [Kj])2 = V ar [Kj] + 2
where
V ar [Kj] = E
h
(K   E [K])2 j
i
= E
h
(K   )2 j
i
= E
h
(%x + (1  %x) z   )2 j
i
= E
h
(1  %x)2 (z   )2 j
i
=
%2z

is the equilibrium value of volatility. Replacing these results in expression (18) we obtain
E [W (k; ) j] = (1  ) 2   (1  2) 1
2

%2z

+ 2

  1
2
%2x

=
1
2
2   1
2

(1  2) %
2
z

+
%2x


=
1
2
2   1
2
(1  2)+  (1  )2
[+  (1  )]2 :

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Abstract
When individual returns are increasing in the aggregate level of investment, decen-
tralized individuals fail to internalize the positive externality of their investment on the
return of others. This paper shows how nancial intermediation mitigates this coordina-
tion failure for individuals with private information. When providing nancial products
with low risk, intermediaries induce individuals with unfavorable private information to
invest more. The increase in investment generates positive externalities, thereby raising
social welfare and making banks socially desirable.
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1 Introduction
Condence and expectations are critical to determine equilibrium allocations in economies
with production externalities since there is the possibility of coordination failure. Decentral-
ized individuals do not internalize the positive externality of their investment on the return of
others, thereby investing too little. Within this class of economies, how do nancial interme-
diaries permit more e¤ective coordination in the market? And how do intermediaries a¤ect
equilibrium allocations and social welfare?
To answer these questions, we consider an economy with production externalities in which
individuals have private information about the underlying economic fundamentals. Our analy-
sis builds on the model of Angeletos and Pavan (2004) in which the return to individual in-
vestment is increasing in the aggregate level of investment. Their framework has two main
advantages. First, it is possible to compute social welfare explicitly and, second, results do
not hinge on the volatility of the underlying economic fundamentals. We extend their model
by adding nancial intermediaries which transfer funds from a pool of investors to a pool of
rms. Intermediaries are able to reduce the volatility of the underlying economic fundamen-
tals of individual rms by monitoring them and, as a result, intermediaries are able to o¤er
nancial products which pay a relatively constant return across states.
The novel contribution of the paper is to show how nancial intermediation alleviates the
coordination failure which arises in economies with investment externalities. In a nutshell, the
central argument of the paper is that intermediaries are able to create safe assets which en-
tice investment by those individuals with unfavorable private information a ight-to-quality
e¤ect by pessimistic individuals. Production externalities raise individual returns throughout
the economy, further stimulating investment and increasing social welfare.
To x ideas, consider the following example. A large number of investors are choosing
how much to invest in a new sector. The protability of the rms in this sector depends
on an exogenous productivity parameter which we call the economic fundamentals and
on aggregate investment. The investors thus have an incentive to align their choices, which
makes individual investment overly sensitive to public information about the fundamentals.
In Section 2, we consider a market-based nancial system in which individuals with ho-
mogenous expectations invest directly in rms, and show how coordination failures generate
underinvestment. Better public information is benecial for social welfare, since investors use
public information to ne-tune their choices and take more e¢ cient decisions.
In Section 3, we consider the existence of private information, which introduces hetero-
geneity in expectations about the underlying fundamentals. Heterogenous beliefs engender
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cross-sectional heterogeneity in investment choices, as pessimistic individuals (who received
unfavorable private information) invest less than optimistic individuals.
We then consider the existence of nancial intermediaries which reduce the uncertainty in
the fundamentals, by alleviating the agency problems resulting from the relationship between
investors and rms. One important problem arises if the manager of the rm must take some
action to make proper use of the funds they have obtained from investors. For example,
the manager may have the possibility to choose between two projects: one with high risk
and private benets and another with low risk and no private benets. Investors cannot
observe the managers decisions, but the nancial intermediary can observe the managers
actions by paying a monitoring cost. Hence, investors hire the intermediary to check what
the manager is doing, and prevent him from choosing the riskiest project.1 By monitoring
the rm, nancial intermediaries are able to transform risky investment projects into safe
projects, thus enabling intermediaries to o¤er safe nancial products to investors. Indeed,
traditional banking activities transform risky investment in rms into safer nancial assets,
like time deposits.
We contrast the results between a nancial system based exclusively on direct nance,
and a nancial system with coexistence between direct and intermediated nance. Pessimistic
individuals prefer investing in safer nancial products o¤ered by nancial intermediaries rather
than investing directly in rms. Pessimistic individuals end up investing more than they
would invest in a market-based nancial system, thus raising aggregate investment. Individual
returns increase as a result of investment complementarities, thereby inducing investment
by optimistic investors. Aggregate investment and social welfare increase with coexistence
between intermediated and direct nance.
Since it is possible to compute social welfare explicitly, we provide policy recommendations
on how to mitigate coordination failures. Our results suggest stimulating nancial interme-
diation when the degree of strategic complementarity between rms is large and there is
substantial uncertainty regarding the fundamentals.
Our analysis has implications not only for economic policy but also for empirical work.
Our model provides testable implications regarding the extent to which rms, industries, and
regions can be expected to su¤er from restrictions in intermediated nance or can be expected
to benet from government policies which boost indirect nance. In particular, changes in
bank lending and credit policies will have the most impact where strategic complementarities
are the most prevalent.
1We assume that only the intermediation sector has access to the monitoring technology, or it is e¢ cient
to have a bank as a delegated monitor. In Germany and Japan, banks have large equity stakes in large
corporations and perform a very important corporate governance role in large corporations.
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Review of the literature. Industries with production externalities are one example in which
strategic complementarities play a prominent role. The individual rms production function
displays production externalities when the productivity of the individual rm increases with
aggregate production. For instance, Cooper and John (1988) consider a model with technolog-
ical complementarities among input suppliers to a shared production process of a public good,
while Bryant (1983) shows that specialization and imperfect information lead to strategic com-
plementarities among producers. In both frameworks, an increase in aggregate production will
raise individual gains.
Another justication for the existence of production externalities is Alfred Marshalls con-
cept of external scale economies. According to Marshall (1890), there are three sources of
external scale economies at the rm level. First, there is the potential for more extensive in-
teraction between suppliers and buyers, allowing for productivity gains resulting from vertical
disintegration and supplier specialization. In a similar vein, Diamonds (1982) search model
assumes that an increase in the number of potential trading partners makes trade easier,
which in turn makes production more e¢ cient. Second, there is the rms ability to capture
industry-specic knowledge and information spillovers which take place in related industries
(as in Carvalho and Voigtländer 2014). Third, there are benets from a larger pool of skilled
labor associated with a stronger industry, and which favors the rm-worker matching process.
The endogenous growth literature has also provided several justications for the existence
of production externalities. According to Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), capital includes
both physical and human components, and two key assumptions generate technological com-
plementarities. First, knowledge creation is a side e¤ect of physical investment. A rm that
increases its physical capital learns simultaneously how to produce more e¢ ciently. Second,
each rms knowledge is a public good that any other rm can access at zero cost. Once
discovered, a piece of knowledge spills over across the whole economy so that all rms can
benet from it. Alternatively, Barro (1990) shows that tax-nanced government services are
another possible source of production externalities. In this case, the governments choices
determine the productivity in the economy.
External economies also play an important role in shaping the pattern of international
trade, and are decisive in shaping the pattern of interregional trade. Researchers in interna-
tional trade and economic geography have joined geographers and urban economists in investi-
gating the relationship between production externalities and geographical agglomeration (see,
for example, Krugman 1991a, 1991b). Below, we suggest using geographical agglomeration
as a measure of production externalities.
A number of authors have embedded technological complementarities in general equi-
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librium models. Baxter and King (1991) and Benhabib and Farmer (1994) build dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models with technological complementarities and a representa-
tive agent, whereas Acemoglu (1993) considers a model with technological complementarities
and heterogenous individuals.
Morris and Shin (2002) analyze an environment with strategic complementarities and
heterogenous information. Since complementarities are present only at the private level,
they nd that more transparent public information can reduce welfare. Unlike Morris and
Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2004) consider an economy in which complementarities are
present at the social level, so that more precise public information necessarily increases welfare.
Still, none of these authors consider changes in the volatility of the underlying fundamentals,
as we do.
The nance literature has used bankruptcy as an instrument to identify channels for (nega-
tive) spillover e¤ects among rms. Lang and Stulz (1992) and Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija
(1997) document spillover e¤ects of bankruptcy lings on investors of industry peers. Hertzel,
Li, O¢ cer, and Rodgers (2008) examine bankruptcy contagion e¤ects along the supply chain
of ling rms, while Boone and Ivanov (2012) dene proximate non-ling rms as strategic
alliance partners. Jorion and Zhang (2007) and Hertzel and O¢ cer (2012) document bank-
ruptcy contagion e¤ects on industry capital providers. Addoum, Kumar, Le, Niessen-Ruenzi
(2015) document that, following the bankruptcy of a geographically proximate rm, rms
that are located geographically near the bankrupt rm reduce their investment expenditures.
They document worse credit conditions for local rms if a local rm les for bankruptcy.
In a model with strategic complementarities and bank lending, Bebchuk and Goldstein
(2011) show that rms are vulnerable to credit market freezes. Banks avoid lending to rms
out of self-fullling fear (validated in equilibrium) that other banks would withhold loans to
rms, thus causing their default. Like Bebchuk and Goldstein, we also suggest policies to
mitigate the coordination problem, and point out a number of empirical implications. Still,
there are important di¤erences with our paper. First, we model explicitly the technology
and the preferences in the economy. Second, we consider direct nance from households to
operating rms and not just intermediated lending. Third, we take a broader view of strate-
gic complementarities which enables us to make policy recommendations regarding business
uctuations, and not just extreme conditions such as credit market freezes. Fourth, and most
importantly, our framework enables us to compute social welfare which in turn allows us to
quantify the welfare implications of the policy measures.
A number of recent papers focus on policy issues when there are strategic complementar-
ities. In a coordination model akin to ours, Sákoviks and Steiner (2012) identify the optimal
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policy of investment subsidies. Subsidies should be targeted at those rms (i) whose invest-
ment has relatively large spillover e¤ects on the economy (as we suggest), and (ii) which are
relatively insensitive to the investment of others themselves (as they consider unlike us het-
erogeneous strategic complementarities across rms). Philippon and Schnabl (2013) analyze
government interventions to recapitalize a banking system which su¤ers from coordination
problems and restricts lending to rms (due to debt overhang). The e¢ cient recapitalization
policy injects capital in the banking system, thus alleviating the coordination problems among
banks and augmenting rmsinvestment.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of investors indexed by i and uniformly distributed in interval [0; 1].
The utility of investor i equals
ui = Aki   1
2
k2i
where ki 2 R represents individual investment, A denotes the individual return to investment,
and k2i =2 is the individual cost of investment. The aggregate level of investment is given by
K =
R 1
0 kidi. As in Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Acemoglu (1996), Romer (1996), and
Angeletos and Pavan (2004), strategic complementarities are embodied in the return A, as
the individual return is increasing in the aggregate level of investment. Formally,
A = (1  ) + K:
The individual return A depends on the underlying exogenous economic fundamentals  and
on the aggregate level of investment K, while  2 0; 12 parametrizes the degree of strategic
complementarity. Finally, social welfare equals
W =
Z 1
0
uidi = AK   1
2
Z 1
0
k2i di = (1  )K   (1  2)
1
2
K2   1
2
Z 1
0
(ki  K)2di:
As a result of strategic complementarities, social welfare depends both on the economic fun-
damentals and on aggregate investment. The term 12
R 1
0 (ki  K)2di represents cross-sectional
heterogeneity in investment decisions.
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2.1 Market-based nance
Under market-based nance, ki represents the direct investment of individual i in a represen-
tative rm. Individuals choose ki to maximize their utility.
If  were known, individuals would set ki =  and all investors would invest the same
amount. Yet, the rst-best prescribes setting a level of individual investment ki larger than
. Decentralized individuals do not internalize the positive externality of their investment on
the return of others.2
We now examine the cases in which the underlying economic fundamentals  are uncertain.
The exogenous return  is not known at the time the investment decisions are made. Unlike
Angeletos and Pavan (2004), we assume that the underlying economic fundamentals  are
a normal random variable with mean  and variance 1 . Investor i maximizes its expected
utility Ei[ui], so that optimal individual investment is given by
ki = (1  )Ei[] + Ei[K]:
Individual investment is an increasing linear function of the expected economic fundamentals
and the expected aggregate investment.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium exists, is unique and given by ki = . Ex ante social welfare
is given by E[W ] = 12
2
.
Individual investment is constant, so that the volatility in the economic fundamentals
has no impact on ki. Social welfare does not depend on the volatility of the economic fun-
damentals. Again, there is an underinvestment problem as the rst-best level of individual
investment is larger than .
2A Pigouvian corrective subsidy policy would implement the rst-best allocation.
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2.2 Market-based nance with public information
Consider that individuals receive an additional public signal z, such that
z =  +
1p

"
where " is a standard normal random variable, independent of . The public signal z has
precision .
Proposition 2 With public information, the equilibrium exists, is unique and given by ki =
1+2z with 1 =

+ and 2 =

+ . Ex ante social welfare is given by E[W ] =
1
2
2
+ (+) .
The equilibrium investment ki is a weighted average between the mean of the economic
fundamentals  and the public signal z, with the weights depending on the variance of the
fundamentals and on the precision of the public signal. All investors invest the same amount
ki, which varies with the public signal z.
It is e¢ cient to set a high level of investment when the fundamentals are good and produc-
tivity is high. Increasing the precision of public information raises expected welfare, since the
public signal z provides additional information about the fundamentals , thereby allowing
investors to ne-tune their investment ki to the exogenous return .
Such a ne-tuning e¤ect provides a justication for promoting and regulating the disclosure
of public information. It calls for stricter requirements regarding the disclosure of information
by publicly traded companies, and demands incentives for the certication role by auditors
or credit rating agencies.3 It also entails increased transparency through disclosures from
governments and other o¢ cial institutions such as central banks.
Still, producing public information is not protable. Financial intermediaries have no
incentives to provide public information, if collecting information is costly. Intermediaries
would be able to o¤er nancial products identical to the ones already available to nancial
markets, but with lower return (since intermediaries would have to bear a cost to collect
information and therefore charge fees to depositors). There is a free-rider problem, since
everybody benets from public information. For the rest of the paper, we do not consider the
existence of a public signal z.
3A number of studies also suggests that bank loans provide public information to the market about the
nancial health of the rm (see, for example, James 1987). This is an additional channel through which
nancial intermediation is likely to have a positive e¤ect on welfare.
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3 Private information
We assume that each individual receives an additional piece of private information. Such
information introduces heterogeneity in expectations about the fundamentals  and may be
understood as heterogeneity in the reading and interpretation of available information. With
heterogenous beliefs about , there is cross-sectional heterogeneity in investment decisions,
with optimistic individuals investing more than pessimistic individuals.
In Section 3.1 we investigate the case of market-based nance. Then, in Section 3.2 we
consider the existence of a representative nancial intermediary. The intermediary collects
funds from individuals and invests these funds in rms. Monitoring enables the intermediary
to o¤er an asset with less risk and lower expected return than direct investment in rms.
Individuals can choose to invest directly in the rm, or they can choose to invest their funds
through the nancial intermediary. Pessimistic investors choose the safest option among
the two investment alternatives, while optimistic investors choose market-based nance as it
increases their potential gains.
In Section 3.3, we contrast the outcome in a market-based nancial system with the out-
come in a nancial system with coexistence between intermediated and direct nance. Coex-
istence raises aggregate investment, thus increasing social welfare as a result of technological
complementarities.
3.1 Market-based nance
There is a continuum of small rms nanced directly by investors. Recall that the underlying
economic fundamentals  follow a normal random variable with mean  and variance 1 .
Consider that each investor receives a private signal
xi =  +
1p

"i
where "i is standard normal, independent across investors and independent of , and  para-
metrizes the precision of private information.
Proposition 3 With private information, equilibrium exists, is unique and given by ki =
3 + 4xi with 3 =

+(1 ) and 4 =
(1 )
+(1 ) . Ex ante social welfare is given by E[W ] =
(1  )
h

2
+ 4
i
  (1  2)12
h

2
+
24

i
  12
24
 .
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Figure 1: Expected social welfare with market-based nance as a function of  and . Other
parameters in this example:  = 0:85 and  = 4; in (a)  = 0:25 and in (b)  = 5.
The functional form of equilibrium investment ki is similar to the case with public infor-
mation. Still, the weights of the two pieces of information in function ki depend on the degree
of strategic complementarity . If  = 0, the two pieces of information would be given weights
that are proportional to their precision (e.g., the private signal xi would be given a weight
equal to + ). The weights in the equilibrium strategy ki deviate from these, so that the
private signal is given relatively less weight. This property reects the coordination motive
arising from strategic complementarity in the actions of investors. It reects the dispropor-
tionate inuence of the public information embedded in the economic fundamentals, which
individuals use to align their investment decisions.
What e¤ects do the precision  and the degree of strategic complementarity  have on
welfare? Expected welfare decreases with the precision of the fundamentals as individuals
decrease the weight given to the private signal xi and reduce the ne-tuning e¤ect described
above. The derivative of the expected social welfare E[W ] with respect to  is negative, and
this e¤ect is illustrated in Figure 1(a) for specic values of ; ; and .
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Investors reduce the weight placed on private information as strategic complementarities
increase, thus reducing the social benet of the ne-tuning e¤ect. Figure 1(b) depicts a
numerical example showing a negative relationship between expected welfare and the degree
of strategic complementarity . We performed a set of numerical simulations using grids for
parameters  and  to investigate if the results were sensitive to the combination of these
parameters, and we veried that results were robust to all settings.4
3.2 Coexistence between intermediated and market-based nance
We want to analyze now if a nancial intermediary that comes between the investors and
the rms can make it possible to increase investment. The main objective is to show that
intermediaries raise individual investment by pessimistic investors, thus improving aggregate
productivity as a result of strategic complementarities.
Financial intermediation as delegated monitoring. We employ a standard model
of investment with moral hazard. There is a continuum of rms, each managed by an entre-
preneur. Each entrepreneur has the possibility to choose between two projects:
 The risky project o¤ers pledgeable income A plus a private benet to the manager of
the rm.
 The safe project o¤ers pledgeable income and no private benet. The pledgeable income
equals (1  )b + K with b =  +rb (   )
where the random variable  is a mean-preserving spread of b, so thatqb < 1 with 1=b
being the variance of b. Aggregate investment is equal to K, and includes investment
through the nancial intermediary and direct investment in rms.
The choice of project by the entrepreneur is not observable (and therefore not contractible).
Firms are perfectly competitive and entrepreneurs have limited liability. As a result, outside
investors appropriate the pledgeable income of the project, and entrepreneurs keep the non-
pledgeable part. It follows that entrepreneurs would rather implement the risky project.
Consider the existence of a representative nancial intermediary. Some investors deposit
their funds with the intermediary, which invests these funds in a pool of rms. Each rm is
4Numerical simulations for the paper may be found in the webpage http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/jjorge/,
under the tab Research.
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managed by an entrepreneur and nanced either by the intermediary or directly by investors.
As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), nancial intermediaries monitor the rm at a cost m >
0 and prevent entrepreneurs from appropriating the private benet of the risky project.5
Entrepreneurs would rather obtain nance directly from uniformed investors, thus avoiding
monitoring and implementing the risky project. With monitoring, they become indi¤erent
between both projects for simplicity, we assume that entrepreneurs choose the safe project.
Only those entrepreneurs unable to obtain direct nance will seek informed capital from a
nancial intermediary.6
For simplicity, there are no conicts of interest between the intermediary and its depositors,
so that the intermediary will monitor the rms.7 Intermediaries o¤er a nancial product to
individual investors with return equal to
bA = (1  )b + K  m
and individuals investing through a nancial intermediary have utility
bui = bAbki   1
2
bk2i
where bki represents the individual investment in the intermediary. Individuals who invest
directly in rms benet from an individual return
A = (1  ) + K
5Monitoring encompasses (i) sreening projects when there is adverse selection as in Broecker (1990), (ii)
preventing moral hazard in the implementation of investment projects as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and
(iii) auditing those projects who fail to meet contractual obligations, as in Townsend (1979) and Gale and
Hellwig (1985). These monitoring activities can be performed by specialized rms which produce information
such as rating agencies, auditors, or other nancial analysts. Yet, the delegated monitoring theory of nancial
intermediation (see, for example, Diamond 1984 or Holmstrom and Tirole 1997) suggests that banks have a
comparative advantage in these monitoring activities. Having a bank as a delegated monitor is advantageous
when there are scale economies in monitoring, indivisibilities in investment projects, or low costs of delegation.
The literature often assumes that monitoring creates new investment opportunities which dominate available
opportunities in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. We require less, as we assume that the return
on monitored projects second-order stochastically dominates the return on non-monitored projects.
6Alternatively, one could consider that the nancial intermediary screens rms and issues securities which
transfer risk from pessimistic to optimistic investors in the spirit of Coval and Thakor (2005). Moral hazard
or adverse selection are not indispensable assumptions. Rather, the only indispensable assumption is that the
intermediary is able to reduce the risk of investment and therefore reduce the risk of the nancial products
being o¤ered to their clients. The ability to o¤er products with little risk is a mild assumption, and a common
result in the nancial intermediation literature. For example, Allen and Gale (1997) document that nancial
intermediaries build up capital so as to o¤er an intertemporal smoothing of risk.
7The bank may be tempted not to monitor and appropriate m. The bank has no incentives to do this, since
depositors would learn from the distribution of returns that the intermediary was not monitoring and would
pick other investment alternatives or not invest at all.
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and have utility eui = Aeki   1
2
ek2i
where eki represents direct individual investment in rms. Individuals compare the expected
return obtained in both investment alternatives, and invest exclusively in the alternative which
yields the highest expected return.
Since  is a mean-preserving spread of b, then Ei[A] > Ei[ bA] for su¢ ciently high xi and
Ei[A] < Ei[ bA] for su¢ ciently low xi. There is a threshold x for the private signal at which
individuals are indi¤erent between investing directly in the rms or via an intermediary.
Investors with a private signal xi above the indi¤erence threshold x prefer to invest directly
in rms, whereas there is a group of individuals with signals below x who would rather invest in
the intermediary. For this group of investors there is a ight-to-quality e¤ect, but individuals
with high private signals are not willing to invest in a nancial product with low risk as it
limits the upside potential.
We call optimistic to those investors who receive a private signal xi > x, and pessimistic
to those investors who receive a private signal xi below x and nd optimal to invest through
the nancial intermediary. Only pessimistic investors are willing to switch from direct to
intermediated nance.
If all pessimistic individuals invested through the nancial intermediary, then the mass of
investors in the intermediary would be variable. In this setting, the equilibrium investment
decisions eki and bki are not necessarily linear, in which case there is no analytical solution to
the model.
In order to keep the analysis tractable enough to investigate the role of nancial inter-
mediation, we measure the marginal e¤ect of adding a small nancial intermediation system
to the market equilibrium. To this end, we assume an economy or sector where nancial
intermediation is incipient. To put it more formally, we consider the limiting case when the
nancial intermediation sector is very small and only a small fraction of investors  > 0 can
invest through the representative nancial intermediary, and these investors cannot invest
innite amounts in the intermediary.
For those investors who choose direct nance, individual investment equals
eki = Ei[(1  ) + K]
while investment for those investors who choose intermediated nance equals
bki = Ei[(1  )b + K] m:
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Aggregate investment equals
K =
Z
[0;1]nB
ekidi+ Z
B
bkidi
where B is the set of investors who invest through the nancial intermediary. The next result
shows that there is a unique equilibrium with coexistence between direct and intermediated
nance when the nancial intermediation sector is su¢ ciently small and monitoring costs are
not too high.
Proposition 4 With private information, for su¢ ciently small values of  and m, there
is a unique equilibrium in which nancial intermediaries coexist with market-based nance.
Equilibrium is given by eki = 5 + 6xi + 7m + 8 and bki = 9 + 10xi + 11m + 12, with
5 ! 3; 6 ! 4; 7 ! 0; 8 ! 0; 9 ! 

1 + 41 


+ + (1  ) bb+ ; 10 ! (1 )b+ +
(1 )2
[(+) ]+ ; 11 !  1 and 12 ! 0 as  converges to 0.
In the proof of Proposition 4 we compute the marginal e¤ect of introducing nancial
intermediaries in the market-based economy described in Section 3.1. As in the market-based
economy, individual investment depends on  and xi. Regarding the investment of those
individuals who choose direct nance, the weights 5 and 6 are near the values obtained in
Proposition 3. As for the investment decisions of those individuals who invest through the
nancial intermediary, the weights 9 and 10 now depend on the variance of b.
Individual investment decisions also depend on the monitoring cost m. Lower monitoring
costs raise the individual investment from those individuals who invest through the nancial
intermediary. Productivity increases as a result of investment complementarities, thereby
enticing individuals who invest directly in rms to raise their investment. As a result, the
coe¢ cient 7 converges to zero from below.
3.3 Contrasting a nancial system based exclusively on market-based -
nance with a nancial system with coexistence
In this section we compare the equilibrium in Proposition 3 with the equilibrium in Proposition
4, and show that coexistence raises aggregate investment and social welfare.
In the next result, we compare individual and aggregate investment in a nancial system
based exclusively on marked-based nance (obtained in Proposition 3) with individual and
aggregate investment in a nancial system with coexistence (obtained in Proposition 4).
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Proposition 5 In equilibrium with private information and for su¢ ciently small values of 
and m, eki > ki for i 2 [0; 1] nB, bki > ki for i 2 B, and K > K.
The value invested by those individuals who choose the nancial intermediary is higher
than the value they would invest if they chose direct nance. As a result of investment
complementarities, all individuals invest more in the case of coexistence, thus increasing the
level of aggregate investment.
The social welfare with coexistence equals the sum of investors welfare, the nancial
intermediarys prot, rmsprots and managersprivate benets. We assume that perfectly
competitive capital markets drive the prots of the representative nancial intermediary and
of rms to zero. With private benets arbitrarily small, social welfare converges to investors
welfare. The next proposition compares welfare in a nancial system based exclusively on
market-based nance with welfare in a nancial system with coexistence.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium with private information and for su¢ ciently small values of 
and m, ex ante social welfare increases with coexistence.
Financial intermediation is socially desirable. Decentralized individuals do not internalize
the positive externality of their investment on the return of others. Financial intermediaries
raise individual investment, thus generating positive externalities and raising social welfare.
Although there is a monitoring cost associated to investment through the intermediary, the
e¤ect of strategic complementarities dominates.
The impact of nancial intermediation on social welfare is less relevant for less volatile
fundamentals. In this case, individuals place little weight on private information, so that
there is little dispersion of individual investment (individuals set their investment close to )
and nancial intermediaries have little impact on investment decisions. Figure 2(a) depicts a
numerical example showing the percentage increase in expected welfare as the economy shifts
from a market-based system to a nancial system with coexistence between intermediaries and
markets, as a function of  when the ratio b is constant. The gure suggests that nancial
intermediaries become more relevant as the volatility of fundamentals increases.
Financial intermediation is relevant if and only if there are strategic complementarities.
Without strategic complementarities, raising individual investment does not increase individ-
ual return and welfare. The numerical example depicted in Figure 2(b) suggests that nancial
intermediaries add more welfare as the degree of strategic complementarity increases.
We performed numerical simulations for various combinations of parameters ; ; ;m; ; b;
and ; and obtained qualitative results identical the ones plotted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Change in expected social welfare from markets to coexistence when  = 0:005%; as
a function of  and . Other parameters in this example:  = 0:85;  = 4;m = 10 5; b = 1:4;
in (a)  = 0:25 and in (b)  = 5.
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3.4 Policy recommendations
The main contribution of our paper so far has been to show the possibility that nancial
intermediation adds to social welfare. Our results suggest that the size of the change in
social welfare depends on the precision of the fundamentals  and the degree of strategic
complementarity , so that we shall now specify in which cases nancial intermediation should
be encouraged.
First, the welfare e¤ect of nancial intermediation increases when fundamentals are more
volatile, thus suggesting that authorities should ne-tune their policies so as to incite inter-
mediated nance to those industries which experience high uncertainty as a result of tech-
nological or regulatory shocks. In particular, credit lines targeted towards these industries
would enhance investment and productivity. By the same token, those geographical areas
which undergo periods of economic instability would benet from favorable credit conditions.
At the aggregate level, our model prescribes raising the aggregate provision of interme-
diated nance in periods of macroeconomic uncertainty. For example, policy actions which
inuence the supply of bank credit will have an impact on investment if bank borrowers
have no close substitutes to bank credit. Easy bank credit in periods of aggregate uncer-
tainty would encourage intermediated loans so as to support rmsaccess to credit, fostering
aggregate investment and returns, and raising aggregate welfare.
Second, intermediated nance is most useful in those industries with a substantial degree of
strategic complementarity. Our results suggest that policy makers should promote specialized
lending to those rms which benet from external scale economies. Our model advises against
subsidizing industries which do not benet from strategic complementarities.
The equilibrium analysis in this section also provides a framework for analyzing and com-
paring specic government policies intended to promote lending.
(i) The infusion of capital into the banking system would raise the amount of intermediated
funds, thus raising welfare. In our model, this would be equivalent to increasing the size of
the representative nancial intermediary.
(ii) Direct lending to rms would increase investment and welfare. In our model this would
be equivalent to increasing the level of aggregate capital K. As in Bebchuk and Goldstein
(2011), direct lending su¤ers from a disadvantage, as the government does not have the ability
to monitor rms.
(iii) Government guarantees which provide funds to operating rms when they have low
returns would increase individual investment and social welfare. These guarantees enable
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rms to o¤er stable returns to investors without wasting so much government resources as
direct lending. Public guarantees would benet from the advantages of monitoring, if these
guarantees were channeled through specialized nancial intermediaries.
3.5 Empirical implications
In addition to providing a framework for analyzing and evaluating government-supported
mechanisms, our analysis also has substantial implications for empirical investigation.
First, Figure 2(b) suggests that nancial intermediation is more important when strategic
complementarities are most prevalent, so that a contraction in intermediated nance should
have di¤erent impact across industries and geographical areas. A sharp test of our model
would compare the impact of shocks on bank credit across industries and geographical areas
with various degrees of strategic complementarity. One would expect industry clusters and
regions with intense complementarities to be more sensitive to credit rationing. Bebchuk and
Goldstein (2011) also suggest that sectors and regions with large strategic complementarities
are more vulnerable to credit freezes.8
Second, policies which stimulate the supply of intermediated nance should have more
impact on those industries and geographical areas where strategic complementarities are most
prevalent. To the extent that bank lending depends on central banksactions, monetary policy
should have a di¤erential impact across regions and across industries. Using data for the US,
Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) document that monetary policy has a di¤erential impact
across regions, and some sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing, are more sensitive to
monetary policy shocks than other sectors, such as services and retail. Yet, it remains to be
shown that industry clusters and regions with intense complementarities are more sensitive
to monetary policy shocks.
Third, agglomeration is widely recognized as a source and result of external scale economies.
Jorge and Rocha (2016) use geographic concentration as a proxy for strategic complementar-
ities, and document higher sensitivity to bank credit shocks among rms in industries with
strong strategic complementarities.
Finally, our results suggest that supporting nancial intermediation is likely to raise welfare
signicantly, and some of the responses to recent crises seem to conform to this belief. Using
data for the Japanese banking crisis, Giannetti and Simonov (2013) show how bank bailouts
had a positive e¤ect on operating rms. Tong and Wei (2011) analyze 192 interventions for
8Still, Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) highlight a di¤erent channel. They suggest that banks may refuse to
lend to rms in sectors which benet from strategic complementarities.
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15 countries from September 2008 to July 2010, and show that unconventional monetary
interventions aimed at inducing banks to be more willing to lend had a positive e¤ect on
non-nancial rms.
Overall, our model highlights the need for and the value of empirical research which identi-
es the role of strategic complementarities in the relationship between nancial intermediation
and welfare.
4 Conclusion
We o¤er a stylized view of nancial intermediation our intermediary is rather similar to an
institution which monitors and holds equity positions in rms but one that is adequate for
our purposes and is consistent with the results in the literature on nancial intermediation.
We examine the welfare e¤ects of introducing nancial intermediaries in economies with
investment complementarities. Decentralized individuals do not internalize the positive exter-
nality of their investment on the return of others, thereby investing too little. By monitoring
rms and o¤ering low risk nancial products, intermediaries induce pessimistic individuals to
invest more. Increased investment raises returns due to strategic complementarities, thus in-
ducing more investment across the economy. In this way, intermediaries help to overcome the
coordination failure among decentralized individuals, thus raising social welfare and making
nancial intermediation socially desirable.
Three extensions to the model may provide additional insights that have not been captured
in the paper. First, we have assumed that nancial intermediaries are special because they
possess a monitoring technology which enables them to o¤er safe securities. Instead, one
could consider that intermediaries have access to the same technology as other investors and
assume that intermediaries use their capital to hedge the risk in the underlying economic
fundamentals. Capital enables intermediaries to o¤er safe nancial products by averaging
risks across states. This involves depleting capital if the returns to nancial intermediaries
assets are low, and accumulating gains if returns are high. Intermediaries can thus o¤er
nancial products which pay a relatively constant amount across states. Allen and Gale
(1997) use a multiperiod model to describe how intermediaries build up their capital. They
suggest that intermediaries can perform intertemporal smoothing in individual welfare, by
averaging risks over time. This entails intermediaries building up reserves of safe assets when
the returns on intermediariesassets are high, and reducing them when returns are low.
Second, we have restricted the set of contracts available to investors. Investors and nan-
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cial intermediaries have an equity stake in the rm and appropriate the whole surplus. Our
qualitative results carry over to a less restrictive set of contracts, as long as nancial interme-
diaries o¤er contracts with low risk. Still, enlarging the set of available contracts opens the
debate on the quantitative signicance of our results. Since the most common forms of inter-
mediated nance bank credit and bank deposits have less risk than equity and reinforce
the risk absorption by nancial intermediaries, the existence of credit and deposit contracts
is likely to strengthen the e¤ects described in the paper.
Finally, we have performed our analysis for the particular case in which the nancial inter-
mediation system is small. In a model with strategic complementarities, Corsetti, Dasgupta,
Morris and Shin (2004) show that a large player exercises a disproportionate inuence on the
behavior of small players. Extending our analysis to the case in which the intermediation
system is large would allow for a more complete policy analysis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We guess ki = , so that K =
R 1
0
kidi =
R 1
0
di = . Hence, ki = (1   )Ei[] + Ei[K] = (1   ) +  = 
and the initial guess is veried. Equilibrium is unique as in Angeletos and Pavan (2004).
Expected social welfare is given by
E[W ] = (1  )E [K]  (1  2)1
2
E

K2
  1
2
E
Z 1
0
(ki  K)2di

=
1
2

2
as
R 1
0
(ki  K)2di = 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We guess ki = 1 + 2z, so that K =
R 1
0
kidi =
R 1
0
(1 + 2z)di = 1 + 2z. Hence,
ki = (1  )Ei[] + Ei[K] = (1  ) + z
 + 
+ Ei[1 + 2z] =
= (1  ) + z
 + 
+ (1 + 2z)
=

(1  ) 
 + 
+ 1

 +

(1  ) 
 + 
+ 2

z
and the initial guess is veried with
1 = (1  ) 
 + 
+ 1 , 1 = 
 + 
2 = (1  ) 
 + 
+ 2 , 2 = 
 + 
:
Expected social welfare is given by
E[W ] = (1  )E [K]  (1  2)1
2
E

K2
  1
2
E
24 1Z
0
(ki  K)2di
35 =
= (1  )Ei


 + z
 + 

  (1  2)1
2
 
V ar [K] + (E [K])2

=
= (1  )


2
+

( + )

  (1  2)1
2


( + )
+ 
2

=
1
2

2
+

( + )
:
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We guess ki = 3 + 4xi, so that K =
R 1
0
kidi =
R 1
0
(3 + 4xi)di = 3 + 4. Hence,
ki = (1  )Ei[] + Ei[K] = (1  ) + xi
 + 
+ Ei[3 + 4]
= (1  ) + xi
 + 
+ (3 + 4
 + xi
 + 
)
=

(1  ) 
 + 
+ 3 + 4

 + 

 +

(1  ) 
 + 
+ 4

 + 

xi
and the initial guess is veried with
3 = (1  ) 
 + 
+ 3 + 4

 + 
, 3 = 
 + (1  )
4 = (1  ) 
 + 
+ 4

 + 
, 4 = (1  )
 + (1  )
Expected social welfare is given by
E[W ] = (1  )E [K]  (1  2)1
2
E

K2
  1
2
E
Z 1
0
(ki  K)2di

= (1  )E [K]  (1  2)1
2
 
V ar [K] + (E [K])2
  1
2
E
24 1Z
0
(ki  K)2di
35
= (1  )


2
+
(1  )
 ( + (1  ))

  (1  2)1
2


2
+
((1  ))2
 ( + (1  ))2

  1
2
((1  ))2
 ( + (1  ))2
= (1  )


2
+
4


  (1  2)1
2


2
+
24


  1
2
24

:
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We assume that investors cannot borrow or lend innite amounts from the nancial intermediary, that isbki 2 [k; k] with  1 < k < k < +1.
Lemma 1 There is x and x such that investors who receive a private signal xi 2 [x; x] nd optimal to
invest through the nancial intermediary.
Proof. The maximization problem of an investor who chooses nancial intermediation is given by
maxbki2[k;k] Ei[bui]; s:t: k  bki  k
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and the optimal decision of the investor in the nancial intermediary is bki = Ei[ bA] + 1   2 with
 if k  Ei[ bA]  k then 1 = 2 = 0 and bki = Ei[ bA];
 if Ei[ bA] > k then 1 = 0 and 2 > 0 and bki = k,
 if Ei[ bA] < k then 1 > 0 and 2 = 0 and bki = k;
so that
Ei[bui] =
8><>:
Ei[ bA]k   12k2 if Ei[ bA] < k
1
2
Ei[ bA]2 if k  Ei[ bA]  k
Ei[ bA]k   12k2 if Ei[ bA] > k
which compares with the utility of investors who prefer to invest directly in rms Ei[eui] = 12Ei[A]2, where we
have already substituted the optimal decision eki = Ei[A].
Since  is very small and bki is nite, then the value of K is arbitrarily close to the value of K which follows
from Proposition 3. Since ki = 3 + 4xi, then Ei [K] = 3 + 4 +xi+ .
There are three possible cases k > Ei[ bA]; k  Ei[ bA]  k, and Ei[ bA] > k. The case k  Ei[ bA] 
k; may be (approximately) rewritten as 	  xi  	 with 	 = k+m (1 )
bb+ 3 4 +
(1 )b+ +4 + and 	 =
k+m (1 ) bb+ 3 4 +
(1 )b+ +4 + . In this case, Ei[bui]   Ei[eui] = 12
h
Ei[ bA]2   Ei[A]2i which is proportional to
Ei
h
(1  )b + K  mi2   Ei (1  ) + K2 and is (approximately) equal to
Ei
h
(1  )b + K  mi2   Ei [(1  ) + K]2
=

(1  )b + xib +  + 


 + (1  )  +
(1  )
 + (1  )
 + xi
 + 

 m
2
 

(1  ) + xi
 + 
+ 


 + (1  )  +
(1  )
 + (1  )
 + xi
 + 
2
which represents an inverted parabola.
There are two cases left, k > Ei[ bA] and Ei[ bA] > k. For 	 > xi, we obtain Ei[bui] Ei[eui] = Ei[ bA]k  12k2 
1
2
Ei[A]
2: This expression also represents an inverted parabola. For xi > 	, we also obtain an expression which
represents an inverted parabola. The function Ei[bui]   Ei[eui] is continuous (in particular, it is continuous at
xi = 	 and xi = 	).
Result. The function Ei[bui]  Ei[eui] has roots for m su¢ ciently low.
Proof. Consider the values of xi for which k  Ei[ bA]  k. In this case, Ei[bui]   Ei[eui] > 0 , (1  
)Ei
hb   i > m which holds for some xi.
There are two roots x and x. The cases k > Ei[ bA] and Ei[ bA] > k seldom happen for low k and large k.
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First, we restrict the set of those investors who can choose the nancial intermediary to the less pessimistic
investors. This is the most unfavorable setting for the impact of the nancial intermediation, since the marginal
e¤ect would be stronger if other more pessimistic individuals could use the intermediary. This conservative
approach is appropriate for our study, as we want to undoubtedly establish a role for nancial intermediation.
In this simplied setting, the equilibrium investment decisions eki and bki are linear. Order the individuals
in the interval [0; 1] according to the size of their private signals, and denote the threshold investor who received
signal x by i(x). Dene the set B1 of investors who are slightly less optimistic than individual i(x),
B1 = ]i(x)  ; i(x)[
with small  > 0. We assume that only investors i 2 B1 have the option to choose the nancial intermediary
and, in equilibrium, these individuals invest through the intermediary.
Second, we restrict the set of those investors who can choose the nancial intermediary to the more
pessimistic investors, with
B2 =

i(x); i(x) + 

with B 2 fB1; B2g.
We guess eki = 5 + 6xi + 7m+ 8 and bki = 9 + 10xi + 11m+ 12, so that
K =
Z
[0;1]nB
ekidi+ Z
B
bkidi
=
Z
[0;1]nB
 
5 + 6xi + 7m+ 8

di+
Z
B
 
9 + 10xi + 11m+ 12

di
=
Z
[0;1]nB
 
5 + 7m+ 8

di+
Z
B
 
9 + 11m+ 12

di+ 6
Z
[0;1]nB
xidi+ 10
Z
B
xidi
= (1  )  5 + 7m+ 8+   9 + 11m+ 12+ 6(1  ) + 10x
= (1  )  5 + 6 + 7m+ 8+  9 + 10x+ 11m+ 12
with x =
Z
B
xidi

. Hence,
eki = Ei[(1  ) + K]
= (1  ) + xi
 + 
+ Ei
h
(1  )  5 + 6 + 7m+ 8+  9 + 10x+ 11m+ 12i
= (1  ) + xi
 + 
+ 

(1  )

5 + 6
 + xi
 + 
+ 7m+ 8

+ 

9 + 10x+ 11m+ 12

=

(1  ) 
 + 
+ (1  )5 + (1  )6 
 + 
+ 9

 +

(1  ) 
 + 
+ (1  )6 
 + 

xi
+ [(1  )7 + 11]m+ (1  )8 + 

10x+ 12

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and
bki = Ei h(1  )b + K  mi = (1  )b + xib +  + Ei[K] m
= (1  )b + xib +  + Ei[(1  )  5 + 6 + 7m+ 8+  9 + 10x+ 11m+ 12] m
= (1  )b + xib +  + 

(1  )

5 + 6
 + xi
 + 
+ 7m+ 8

+ 

9 + 10x+ 11m+ 12

 m
=

(1  ) bb +  + (1  )5 + (1  )6  +  + 9

 +

(1  ) b +  + (1  )6  + 

xi
+ [(1  )7 + 11   1]m+ (1  )8 + 

10x+ 12

:
The initial guesses are veried with
5 = (1  ) 
 + 
+ (1  )5 + (1  )6 
 + 
+ 9
6 = (1  ) 
 + 
+ (1  )6 
 + 
7 = (1  )7 + 11
8 = (1  )8 + 

10x+ 12

and
9 = (1  ) bb +  + (1  )5 + (1  )6  +  + 9
10 = (1  ) b +  + (1  )6  + 
11 = (1  )7 + 11   1
12 = (1  )8 + 

10x+ 12

so that
7 =   
1   ; 11 = 7   1
6 =
(1  )
( + )  (1  )
10 =
1
(1  )

(1  )b +  + (1  )(1  )2[( + )  (1  )]  + 

8 = 12 =
x
1  10
5 =
1  +  (1  ) 6

1 + 
1 

+ 2 (1  )
1   (1  )

 + 
+ 
bb + 
9 =  (1  )

1 +
6
1  


 + 
+ [1   (1  )] bb +  :
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When  ! 0,
7 = 0; 11 =  1
6 = 4
10 =

(1  )b +  + (1  )2[( + )  ]  + 

8 = 12 = 0
5 = 3
9 = 

1 +
4
1  


 + 
+ (1  ) bb +  :
The proof is valid for any set B =

i (x0)  2 ; i (x0) + 2

, with small  > 0 and x0 2

x; x

.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
We proceed by steps. First, we compare the level of investment for those individuals who invest through the
bank (i 2 B) with what they would invest if there were no banks. Second, we compare the level of investment
of those individuals who choose direct nance when there are banks (i 2 [0; 1]nB), with their investment when
there are no banks. Finally, we compare the level of aggregate investment and the individual investment
decisions with and without coexistence.
Step 1. To show that
Z
B
bkidi > Z
B
kidi we use the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 The integral
Z
B
bkidi converges to
(1  )
Z
B
Ei[b]di+ (1  )Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej [b]i djdi+ 2(1  )Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej
h
E[b]ii ddjdi+ :::
 
Z
B
mdi  
Z
B
Z
B
mdjdi  2
Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
mddjdi  ::: +
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
hekji djdi
+2
Z
B
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
h
Ej
hekii ddjdi+ 3Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
h
Ej
h
E
hekiii dddjdi+ :::
Proof. We have
Z
B
bkidi = Z
B
Ei[(1  )b + K  m]di = Z
B

(1  )Ei[b] + Ei[K] m di
=
Z
B
0B@(1  )Ei[b] + Ei
264 Z
[0;1]nB
ekjdj + Z
B
bkjdj
375 m
1CA di
= (1  )
Z
B
Ei[b]di+ Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
hekji djdi+ Z
B
Z
B
Ei
hbkji djdi  Z
B
mdi
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= (1  )
Z
B
Ei[b]di+ Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
hekji djdi+ Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
(1  )Ej [b] + Ej [K] mi djdi  Z
B
mdi
= (1 )
Z
B
Ei[b]di+Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
hekji djdi+(1 )Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej [b]i djdi+2Z
B
Z
B
Ei

Ej [K]

djdi 
Z
B
Z
B
mdjdi 
Z
B
mdi .
Reorder the terms, replace K and iterate again,
= (1  )
Z
B
Ei[b]di+ (1  )Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej [b]i djdi  Z
B
Z
B
mdjdi 
Z
B
mdi+ 
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
hekji djdi
+2
Z
B
Z
B
Ei
264Ej
264 Z
[0;1]nB
ekd+ Z
B
bkd
375
375 djdi
= (1  )
Z
B
Ei[b]di+ (1  )Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej [b]i djdi  Z
B
Z
B
mdjdi 
Z
B
mdi+ 
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
hekji djdi+
2
Z
B
Z
B
Ei
264Ej
264 Z
[0;1]nB
ekd
375
375 djdi+ 2Z
B
Z
B
Ei
24Ej
24Z
B
bkd
3535 djdi .
Iterating n times and letting n!1, the term in bk vanishes and we obtain the result.
Apply Lemma 2 to obtainZ
B
kidi = (1  )
Z
B
Ei[]di+ (1  )
Z
B
Z
B
Ei [Ej []] djdi+ 
2(1  )
Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
Ei [Ej [E[]]] ddjdi+ :::
+
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei [kj ] djdi+ 
2
Z
B
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei [Ej [k]] ddjdi
+3
Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei [Ej [E [k ]]] dddjdi+ :::
ComputeZ
B
bkidi  Z
B
kidi =
(1  )
Z
B
Ei[b   ]di+ (1  )Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej [b   ]i djdi+ 2(1  )Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej
h
E[b   ]ii ddjdi+ :::
 
Z
B
mdi  
Z
B
Z
B
mdjdi  2
Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
mddjdi  ::: +
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
hekj   kji djdi
+2
Z
B
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
h
Ej
hek   kii ddjdi+ 3Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
Z
[0;1]nB
Ei
h
Ej
h
E
hek   kiii dddjdi+ :::
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For su¢ ciently low ,Z
B
bkidi  Z
B
kidi!
(1  )
Z
B
Ei[b   ]di+ (1  )Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej [b   ]i djdi+ 2(1  )Z
B
Z
B
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej
h
E[b   ]ii ddjdi+ :::
Since Ei
hbi > Ei [] for i 2 B, then Z
B
bkidi  Z
B
kidi > 0.
Step 2. To show
Z
[0;1]nB
ekidi > Z
[0;1]nB
kidi, apply Lemma 2 to both integrals to obtain
Z
[0;1]nB
ekidi  Z
[0;1]nB
kidi =
Z
[0;1]nB
eki   ki di =  Z
[0;1]nB
Z
B
Ei
hbkj   kji djdi+ 2 Z
[0;1]nB
Z
[0;1]nB
Z
B
Ei
h
Ej
hbk   kii ddjdi+ :::
The terms in ek vanish as a result of Lemma 2. Since we proved in step1 that Z
B
bkidi > Z
B
kidi, then
Z
[0;1]nB
ekidi  Z
[0;1]nB
kidi > 0,
Z
[0;1]nB
ekidi > Z
[0;1]nB
kidi.
Step 3. By steps 1 and 2, K > K and for a su¢ ciently low m, we obtain bki = (1 )Ei[b] +Ei[K] m >
(1  )Ei[] + Ei[K] = ki for i 2 B; and eki = (1  )Ei[] + Ei[K] > (1  )Ei[] + Ei[K] = ki:
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
For i 2 B, individuals choose bki to maximize their expected utility. Hence,
bui = Ei h(1  )b + K  mi bki   1
2
bk2i   Ei h(1  )b + K  mi ki   1
2
k2i

where ki is given in Proposition 3. It follows that
Ei
h
(1  )b + K  mi ki   1
2
k2i

> Ei

[(1  ) + K  m] ki   1
2
k2i

since Ei
hbi > Ei [] and K > K. Moreover,
Ei

[(1  ) + K  m] ki   1
2
k2i

= Ei [ui  mki] ;
so that Ei [bui] > Ei [ui  mki] and Ei [bui] > Ei [ui]for su¢ ciently low m.
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For i 2 [0; 1] nB, individuals choose eki to maximize their expected utility. Hence,
Ei [eui] = Ei (1  ) + K eki   1
2
ek2i   Ei (1  ) + K ki   1
2
k2i

where ki is given in Proposition 3. Since K > K, Ei [eui] > Ei [ui].
Ex ante expected social welfare with coexistence is given by E
264 Z
[0;1]nB
Ei [eui] di+ Z
B
Ei [bui] di
375 which is
larger than E
264 Z
[0;1]nB
Ei [ui] di+
Z
B
Ei [ui] di
375, where ui is the equilibrium utility obtained in Proposition 3.
Since E
264 Z
[0;1]nB
Ei [ui] di+
Z
B
Ei [ui] di
375 = E hR 10 Ei [ui] dii = E hR 10 uidii by the law of iterated expectations,
we obtain the result.
60
Agglomeration and Industry Spillover E¤ects in the
Aftermath of a Credit Crunch
Essay 3
January 2016
Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence showing that industries with intense strategic
complementarities exhibit stronger sensitivity to economic shocks. The 2009´s Portuguese
credit crunch represents a negative shock for nonnancial rms, which has created negative
spillover e¤ects among rms. Corporate investment declines signicantly in industries with
strong strategic complementarities following the onset of the crisis, controlling for rm
xed e¤ects, time varying measures of nancial constraints and investment opportunities.
Consistent with a causal e¤ect, the decline is greatest for rms in industries with strong
strategic complementarities. To address sample selection concerns we consider several
sample splits and apply a matching approach to nd the best counterfactual, and conrm
similar results.
Keywords: Banking, Firms Behaviour, Financial Crises, Coordination, Complemen-
tarities, Externalaties, Panel Data
JEL Classication Codes: G21, D22, G01, C72, D62, C23
61
1 Introduction
Do spillover e¤ects among rms amplify economic shocks? Will rms reduce their output when
their neighbors su¤er negative shocks? Which rms su¤er the most from spillover e¤ects after
an adverse shock? Do these spillover e¤ects depend on the industry? Which industries su¤er
more from spillovers after a credit crunch? To answer these questions we consider a simple
model in which we compare spillover e¤ects among industries before and after a credit shock.
We are interested on a very particular type of spillover e¤ects. First, we are interested in an
environment in which operating rms are interdependent, with their success depending on the
success of other operating rms to put it more formally, we are interested on those spillover
e¤ects which are the source of strategic complementarities among rms. More specically,
we are interested in production externalities where the production of one rm increases the
productivity of the others. Second, we are interested in production externalities which arise as
a result of knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling, and input sharing (the three sources of
external scale economies identied by Marshall, 1890). Third, we focus exclusively on intra-
industry e¤ects. The Venn diagram in Figure 1 claries the type of spillover e¤ects analyzed
in this paper.
Figure 1: Venn diagram illustrating the di¤erent types of spillover e¤ects. This paper focusses
on intra-industry production externalities.
Our analysis is based on the premise (put forward in earlier work, such as Cooper and
John, 1988; Angeletos and Pavan, 2004) that a signicant fraction of rms benets from the
production of other rms in the economy. This interdependence can be generated by multiple
channels. A rms success depends on:
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 The rms which use its outputs, and on those which supply its inputs (see, for example,
Cooper and John, 1988).
 Industry-specic knowledge and information spillovers which take place in the industry
(as in Carvalho and Voigtländer, 2014)
 Access to a large pool of skilled labor, which favors rm-worker matching.
 Its nancial links, as bankruptcy from industry peers may have negative spillover e¤ects.
As a result of these interdependencies, the rms productivity and its protability depend
on its industry peers. It follows that the returns rms will make on borrowed capital will
increase if other rms are able to obtain nancing (either from markets or banks). When
the aggregate production of the industry depends on bank nancing, then a credit crunch
will penalize the productivity of each individual rm even if that individual rm does not see
its credit being rationed. A credit crunch will thus reduce the set of protable investment
opportunities of each rm.
We use the 2009s credit crunch in the Portuguese economy to identify the impact of a
credit shock. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of bank lending in Portugal since January 2005
until the end of 2013. There was a sharp slowdown in the growth rate of bank credit from mid-
2008 until mid-2010, with the annual growth becoming negative in 2009. The deleveraging of
the Portuguese economy is related with the growing needs for bank capital and the liquidity
problems faced by Portuguese banks after the global crisis in 2008.
In this paper we measure how banksreluctance to extend loans to rms has compromised
rmsinvestment. The hypotheses we take to the data are based on models with strategic
complementarities among rms (Angeletos and Pavan, 2004 and 2007; Bebchuk and Goldstein,
2011; Jorge and Rocha, 2016). In theory, negative shocks might hinder rms which benet
from external scale economies, as reduced production by one rm hampers the productivity of
the others. More specically, theory suggests that shortages in the supply of external nance
might hinder investment in those industries which display external scale economies. Moreover,
such e¤ects should be less severe in rms in industries without external scale economies.
To investigate these ideas, we employ a di¤erence-in di¤erences approach in which we
compare rmsinvestment before and after the onset of the crisis as a function of how much
they benet from spillover e¤ects (that is, if they belong to an industry which displays exter-
nal scale economies), controlling for observable measures of external nance constraints and
investment opportunities as well as rm xed e¤ects.
We are mostly interested in studying the role of strategic complementarities on worsening
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Figure 2: Evolution of bank lending in Portugal in the period 2005-13. This gure plots
monthly growth rates of bank loans. Source: Banco de Portugal.
the impact of the credit crunch on investment. Yet, inferences may be confounded if variation
in investment depends on unobserved exogenous variation in (i) credit conditions and, (ii)
investment opportunities. There is a key distinction between endogenous and exogenous
sources of variation in credit conditions and in investment opportunities, since endogenous
changes in these variables are inevitable.
To x ideas, consider the following example. A large number of investors are choosing
how much to invest in a new sector. The protability of the rms in this sector depends on
an uncertain exogenous productivity parameter as well as on the aggregate investment. The
investors thus have an incentive to align their choices. Moreover, decentralized individuals
do not internalize the positive externality of their investment on the return of others, thus
investing too little. In this setup, two channels will endogenously propagate a credit shock.
1. The coordination motive makes investment highly sensitive to the public assessment of
the exogenous productivity parameter. Financial intermediaries mitigate the coordina-
tion problems, as monitoring the rm reduces the uncertainty about the rms exogenous
productivity parameter. Lower volatility entices less optimistic investors to invest, thus
raising productivity and further stimulating investment. The other side of the coin is
that an exogenous bank credit crunch reduces the ability of banks to monitor rms,
thus aggravating the harmful e¤ects of uncertainty and thus depressing investment and
productivity (as in Jorge and Rocha, 2016).
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2. The decision of an intermediary of whether to extend a loan to a given rm depends on
the intermediarys assessment of the rms exogenous productivity parameter and on its
expectation of whether other intermediaries will lend money to other rms. This mech-
anism creates the potential for endogenous credit crunches with inevitable consequences
on productivity (as in Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011).
Our baseline specication, and the rest of our analysis described below, is designed to
address the concerns about exogenous variation in credit conditions and in investment oppor-
tunities. To this purpose, we control for observable measures of external nance constraints
(such as rms debt) and investment opportunities (such as cash ow, sales, and whether the
rm exports or not).
We are also concerned about heterogenous shocks in the supply of credit across industries,
as banks might have cut credit more to some industries than to others and have thus gen-
erated di¤erent e¤ects across industries but which were not related with spillover e¤ects. To
this purpose, we use alternative measures of the bank credit shock (such as the total debt of
the industry).
Moreover, we use several sample splits, in which we select a sample of rms which es-
tablished relationships exclusively with banks which did not show reluctance to extend loans
throughout the period 2006-2012, and a sample of exporting rms which were not a¤ected by
shocks in internal demand. Finally, we apply a matching approach to nd the best counter-
factual in the di¤erence-in di¤erences approach.
We nd that operating rms which benet from strategic complementarities were the most
severely hit by the 2009s credit crunch. We measure the impact on annual investment as a
ratio of assets for Portuguese manufacturing rms, and we compare the impact on indus-
tries with strategic complementarities to the impact on industries without complementarities.
Consistent with the hypothesis that credit shocks are amplied in industries with strategic
complementarities, we nd that rms in industries with strategic complementarities reduce
their investment by more than rms in other industries. Our nal estimate suggests that rms
with strategic complementarities reduce (on average) their annual investment (as a fraction of
assets) by 3:3 percentage points more than rms without strategic complementarities following
the onset of the 2009s credit crunch.
Evidence of spillover e¤ects after credit shocks (for industries with complementarities) has
important implications not only for borrowers, but also for policy makers (as emphasized by
Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011; Jorge and Rocha, 2016).
65
Review of the literature. Our article is related to several disjoint bodies of literature.
The importance of nancial constraints for investment decisions is a classic in nance, with
extensions to macroeconomic theory (as, for example, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991;
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999; DellAriccia, Detragiache
and Rajan, 2008). More specically, Kashyap and Stein, (1994) and (2000) highlight the role
of the bank lending channel. Our paper contributes to this literature by emphasizing the role
of strategic complementarities among rms.
The 2007-2009 global nancial crisis has been used as an experimental eld to study the
e¤ects of banks distress on credit supply (as, for example, Tong and Wei, 2008; Ivashina
and Scharfstein, 2010; Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2010). Within this literature, the pa-
per relates to Lemmon and Roberts (2010), Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) and Almeida,
Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2011), who document a reduction in corporate invest-
ment as a consequence of supply shocks to external nancing. Our results provide evidence
that 2009 credit shock in Portugal had both direct and indirectly real e¤ects on rmsinvest-
ment.
A number of papers in the nancial literature have used bankruptcy as an instrument
to identify channels for spillover e¤ects among rms. Lang and Stulz (1992) and Ferris, Ja-
yaraman and Makhija (1997) document spillover e¤ects of bankruptcy lings on investors
of industry peers. Hertzel, Li, O¢ cer and Rodgers (2008) examine bankruptcy contagion
e¤ects along the supply chain of ling rms, while Boone and Ivanov (2012) dene proxi-
mate non-ling rms as strategic alliance partners. Jorion and Zhang (2007) and Hertzel
and O¢ cer (2012) document bankruptcy contagion e¤ects on industry capital providers. Ad-
doum, Kumar, Le and Niessen-Ruenzi (2015) document that, following the bankruptcy of a
geographically proximate rm, rms that are located geographically near the bankrupt rm
reduce their investment expenditures. They investigate channels for contagion related with
executivescareer concerns, and document that local rms experience worse credit conditions
if a local rm les for bankruptcy. Although this literature presents one channel for spillover
e¤ects among individual rms, there are many other sources of strategic complementarities.
Instead, our priors are rooted on a strong theoretical background which identies mech-
anisms which go beyond specic events like bankruptcy and have important macroeconomic
implications. We base our empirical analysis on the following theoretical contributions.
In a model with strategic complementarities and bank lending, Bebchuk and Goldstein
(2011) show that rms are vulnerable to credit market freezes. Banks avoid lending to rms
out of self-fullling fear that other banks would withhold loans to rms, thus causing their
default. Our paper links rmsinvestment decisions and strategic complementarities and our
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results highlight the importance of intra-industry production externalities on rmsinvestment
decisions.
In a model with production externalities where the production of one rm increases the
productivity of the others, Jorge and Rocha (2016) suggest that bank lending is more impor-
tant when strategic complementarities are most prevalent, so that a credit contraction should
have di¤erent impact across industries and geographical areas. Current paper suggests that
spillover e¤ects are important to understand how credit supply shock spread through indus-
tries
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide details on the role of
strategic complementarities in rmsinvestment in Section 2. Section 3 examines the shock
in bank credit in Portugal in 2009. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, stating our
hypotheses, the baseline specication and robustness tests implemented. Section 5 presents
data and research methods. In Sections 6 and 7 we present and discuss our results in detail.
Some conclusions are o¤ered in the nal section.
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2 The role of strategic complementarities in rms investment
Industries with production externalities are one example in which strategic complementarities
play a prominent role. In these industries, spillover e¤ects among rms will raise the produc-
tivity of an entire industry. One justication for the existence of production externalities is
Alfred Marshall (1890)s concept of external economies.
The benets of external scale economies depend on the level of output of the industry,
thus implying that a reduction in the output of the industry will have a negative impact on
rmsproductivity. Since productivity is a key determinant of investment opportunities, it
follows that a negative shock in output is likely to reduce investment since capital will be less
productive. Operating companies will face more di¢ culties in an environment in which other
operating rms reduce their output.
The 2009s credit market freeze in the Portuguese economy represents an aggregate eco-
nomic shock. The theory suggests that shortages in the supply of external nance might
hinder output in those industries which display external scale economies. For example, Be-
bchuk and Goldstein (2011) study an economy with positive spillovers among operating rms
in which their success depends on the ability of other operating rms to obtain credit. In such
an economy, a credit crunch may arise in which banks abstain from lending to rms with good
projects because of their self-fullling fear that other banks will not be making such loans.
Such credit crunch leads to a fall in investment, since companies will not be able to succeed
in an environment in which other rms fail to obtain nance.
Theory suggests that the e¤ects of economic shocks (namely, a credit crunch) on out-
put and investment will be stronger in those industries which display intense external scale
economies. A shock will have minor impact on those operating rms which do not benet from
strategic complementarities. For example, Figure 2(b) in Jorge and Rocha (2016) suggests
that rms in industries with intense complementarities are more sensitive to credit rationing.
We compare the impact of bank lending on investment across rms which belong to in-
dustries with and without strategic complementarities. Two operating rms with identical
economic and nancial conditions could react di¤erently to the same credit contraction in
terms of their investment decisions, depending on their levels of strategic complementarities.
We expect the rm with intense complementarities to have the largest reaction, controlling
for its intrinsic conditions.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of capital between 2006 and 2012 among two representa-
tive groups of Portuguese manufacturing rms: one group includes industries which display
intense complementarities, and the other group includes rms which display minor strategic
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complementarities. Using 2008 as the reference year, the gure shows that the evolution of
capital is similar among both groups until 2008. After 2009, though, capital falls sharply for
those operating rms which benet from external scale economies, whereas it remains rela-
tively stable for the other group of rms. The evolution of capital suggests that operating
rms which benet from strategic complementarities were the most severely hit by the 2009s
credit crunch.
Figure 3: E¤ect of the 2009 credit shock on rmsratio of capital over assets. The gure plots
the evolution of capital over assets among rms which belong to industries with strategic
complementarities (solid line) and rms which belong to industries without strategic comple-
mentarities (dotted line). The reference year is 2008, in which the ratio of capital over assets
takes the value 100. Capital is the sum of tangible xed assets plus depreciations.
2.1 Identifying rms with strategic complementarities
External scale economies, internal to the industry but external to the rm, are a source of
increasing returns for individual rms and create strategic complementarities.
Agglomeration is widely recognized as a source and result of external scale economies.
We use location theory (as, for example, in Ellison and Glaeser, 1997) to identify those rms
which benet from external scale economies. The theory distinguishes three di¤erent sets of
factors driving the rms location decision problem: external economies, costs of the factors
of production like labour and capital, transportation costs, and natural advantages. External
economies arise from (i) knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling, and input sharing, and
(ii) urbanization economies.
The literature has developed a number of location coe¢ cients which quantify those exter-
nal scale economies that result from the spatial concentration of rms of a particular industry
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in a given region and that are internalized by rms of that particular industry (see, for ex-
ample, Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Guimarães, Figueiredo, and Woodward, 2007). Their basic
principle is to measure the discrepancy between the distribution of regional employment in a
particular industry against the regional distribution of the overall employment. Examples of
industries with high geographic concentration are high-tech industries in Silicon Valley, the
auto industry in Detroit, the entertainment industry in Hollywood, or investment banking in
London. We use the DM index proposed by Guimarães et al. (2007), which controls for:
 Randomness in location decisions, which naturally generates some clustering.
 Industry concentration, which also creates geographical concentration. The high geo-
graphical concentration in industries such as petroleum rening or cement and related
products is almost entirely explained by industrial concentration (and thus by internal
returns to scale) rather than by external scale economies associated with rmscluster-
ing.
 Market factors, such as wages, land costs, market accessibility or transportation costs,
which may generate geographical concentration but are not directly related with external
economies.
 Urbanization economies. Controlling for this factor is a rather conservative approach,
which is likely to reduce the signicance of our results. Knowledge-intensive industries
thrive on the clustering of workers who share ideas and expertise and is the source of
external scale economies.
Since external scale economies are one source of strategic complementarities, we classify
operating rms as "rms beneting from strategic complementarities" if they belong to those
industries which display external scale economies. More specically, we use the DM index as a
proxy for strategic complementarities, since rms belonging to industries with high localization
indices are likely to benet from external scale economies.
We distinguish rms which belong to industries with strategic complementarities and in
which spillover e¤ects are important, from those rms which belong to industries in which
spillover e¤ects are minor. To operationalize this distinction, we divide rms into two groups
according to the DM index of their industry. The rst group includes rms from industries
with high DM indices (the proxy for strong strategic complementarities), whereas the second
group includes rms in industries with low DM indices (and which do not benet from strategic
complementarities) see the appendix for details.
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3 The shock in bank credit
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of bank lending in Portugal since January 2005 until December
2013. There was a sharp slowdown in the growth rate of bank credit from mid-2008 until
mid-2010, with the annual growth becoming negative in 2009. The deleveraging of the Por-
tuguese economy is related with the growing needs for capital and liquidity problems faced by
Portuguese banks after the global crisis in 2008. Evidence of tighter lending in 2009 abounds,
and we compare rmsinvestment before and after this year.1 Banks are the main source of
nancing for Portuguese small and medium size rms.
Banks displayed considerable reluctance to extend loans to rms and compromised their
ability to invest. Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of the 2009 credit shock on rms investment
decisions. We run separate panel regressions for rms belonging to the group with strate-
gic complementarities and for the rms in the group without strategic complementarities.
We regress investment on a set of year dummies, controlling for rm xed e¤ects. Firms
in the group with strategic complementarities su¤er a steep reduction on their investment
after 2008, conrming the strong impact of the 2009s shock, whereas rms without strate-
gic complementarities do not experience a signicant reduction in investment up to 2011.
Our empirical strategy consists of measuring the di¤erential reduction in investment for both
groups.
4 The empirical strategy
We study the role of strategic complementarities (a specic case of spillover e¤ects) in ampli-
fying the impact of economic shocks. For this purpose, we evaluate if a shock has di¤erent
impact on the two groups of rms considered. Formally, we test the hypothesis that the group
with strong complementarities is more sensitive to the shock. More specically, we use the
2009s credit crunch to compare the impact of spillover e¤ects on rmsinvestment decisions.
To analyze the impact of the spillover e¤ects after the shock, we employ a di¤erence-in
di¤erences approach in which we compare rmsinvestment before and after the onset of the
credit crunch as a function of their degree of strategic complementarity, and controlling for
observable measures of external nance constraints and exogenous investment opportunities
as well as rm xed e¤ects.
1For an overview of the 2009s credit crunch see Antunes and Martinho (2012). We chose the year of 2009
to dene the point in time for the beginning of the credit contraction, instead of 2011, avoiding the peak
of the economic recession in Portugal and the confounding factors which derive from the Memorandum of
Understanding.
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Figure 4: E¤ect of the 2009 credit shock on rms ratio of investment over assets. We
run separate panel regressions for rms with and without strategic complementarities of the
investment over assets on the set of year dummies, controlling for rm xed e¤ects. The gure
plots the coe¢ cients obtained for the year dummies (2008 is the omitted year).
Our baseline specication regresses rm-level annual investment over 2006-2012 on a
dummy variable for whether the year in question is after the shock, on a dummy variable
for whether the rms belongs to the group with strategic complementarities, and on the in-
teraction of the two dummy variables. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term measures the
di¤erential impact of the credit shock on the two groups of rms.
The control variables used are total debt to account for external nance constraints, and
cash ow, sales and exporter activity to account for exogenous investment opportunities.2
Firm xed e¤ects subsume the dummy for the groups of rms (because the groups are xed
over time) and control for time-invariant heterogeneity across rms. Standard errors are
clustered at the rm level to correct for within-rm residual correlation.
We conduct several additional robustness tests to address concerns that our results may
be due to confounding e¤ects. These include an alternative to identify the credit contraction
shock, dealing with sample selection problems, and applying a matching approach to nd the
best counterfactual in the di¤erence-in di¤erences approach.
2Total debt is correlated with loan supply, and it is likely to be correlated with loan demand too. If this is
the case, adding total debt to the regression will take explanatory power away from the interaction term. We
will thus obtain a conservative estimate for the coe¢ cient which measures the di¤erential impact of the credit
shock on the two groups of rms. Since its di¢ cult to obtain an instrument for loan supply, we make a sample
slipt with banks which did not restrict credit (see below).
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5 Data and research methods
We collect data from Sabi for Portuguese rms and for the period between 2006 and 2012,
thus covering both crisis and pre-crisis years.3 Sabi includes information about end-of-year
balance sheets, income statements, and banking relationships, and comprehends (almost) all
Portuguese rms. Our unit of observation is the rm-year pair.
We collect data on active rms with available accounting information, and restrict the
selection to manufacturing industries. We sort rms into two groups, as we distinguish a
group of rms in industries with large DM indices from a group of rms with low indices.
We only use those industries with extreme values of the DM index, so as to make a clear
distinction between the group with strategic complementarities and the group without strate-
gic complementarities. Following Guimarães et al. (2007), we consider the top 19 industries
with the highest DM indices, as well as the 16 industries in the lower end of the ranking.
Industries with and without strategic complementarities are those with DM index measured
by Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward 2007 (excluding for industries in petroleum rening,
shipbuilding and repairing, sea products processing, tobacco, and recycling of non-metallic
products). Industries with strategic complementarities are those with DM index above 0:026,
and industries without strategic complementarities are those for which DM index is zero or
not signicantly di¤erent from zero at 95% condence.
Departing from the list of industries presented by Guimarães et al. (2007), we exclude
ve industries because it is likely that their location depends on natural resources and not
on spillover e¤ects caused by strategic complementarities. These industries are petroleum
rening, shipbuilding and repairing, sea products processing, tobacco, and recycling of non-
metalic products. For example, agglomeration in shipbuilding and repairing naturally arises
near seaports.
Finally, we restrict our sample to small and medium size rms (less than 250 employees)
and we exclude micro rms with less than 10 employees (to guarantee reliable data). Using
these lters, we collect data for 984 rms in the group with large DM indices and 240 rms
in the group with low DM indices. The panel is not balanced, as only 730 rms have data for
the 7 years. See the appendix for details.
Following much of the investment literature (as, for example, Duchin et al., 2010; Ivashina
and Scharfstein, 2010; Almeida et al., 2011) we measure investment as capital expenditures
divided by total assets. Capital expenditures in year t are calculated as the di¤erence between
3Sabi database is the subset of the Amadeus database for European rms, and similar to Compustat for
American rms.
73
"xed tangible assets plus depreciations" in year t and the amount of "xed tangible assets"
in year t  1.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for rm-year units from 2006 until 2012. Panel A of
Table 1 includes information on all observations in our sample, of which 6154 observations are
on rms with strategic complementarities and 1490 observations are on rms without strategic
complementarities. Panel A provides mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for
several variables. Panel B of Table 1 distinguishes both groups of rms, and provides means,
and di¤erence-in-means tests for both groups.
The average values for variables like the ratio of capital, total debt, and cash-ow over
assets show that the di¤erences between the two groups are economically small, and the
di¤erence in investment between the two groups is not economically or statistically signicant.
There is a substantial di¤erence in sales and assets, thus implying that the group of rms
without strategic complementarities includes larger rms and suggesting that rms in this
group benet from internal scale economies.
6 Results
6.1 Preliminary results
Table 2 presents results for the two groups of rms (with and without strategic complemen-
tarities) in which we compare investment before the onset of the crisis to investment after. In
the comparison, we average each rms time series into two sample means one for the period
2006-2008, which we label as "before the crisis", and one for the period 2009-2012, which
we label as "after the crisis". Subsequently, we average the rms sample means for each
combination group-period. The table reports whether the di¤erences in average investment
between groups for each period are statistically signicant.
The table shows that investment decreases by one-half for the group of rms with strategic
complementarities. Although the reduction in investment for rms without strategic comple-
mentarities is statistically signicant, it is substantially smaller from the economic point of
view. Overall, results are consistent with our main hypothesis that tight credit conditions
hurt more rms with strategic complementarities. In the analysis which follows, we investigate
these patterns with more detail.
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6.2 Baseline regressions
To quantify the impact of strategic complementarities on investment for both groups of rms
after the credit shock, the analysis relies on the following di¤erence-in di¤erences specication.
INVit = 1 + 1CCt + 2SCi + 3CCt:SCi + 4Wit + t + i + it (1)
where INVit measures the investment of rm i in period t, CCt stands for "credit contraction"
and takes a value of 1 in the period "after" the shock (the period from 2009 through 2012)
and 0 in the period "before" the shock (the period from 2006 through 2008), SCi is a dummy
variable which takes unit value for those rms which belong to the group with large DM
indices and zero otherwise, the interaction term CCt:SCi takes the value of 1 in the period
of the credit contraction if the rm has strategic complementarities and zero otherwise, and
Wit is a vector of control variables (cash ow, net sales variation, total debt, and a dummy
variable which takes a value of 1 if rm i is exporter), t is a set of time dummies and i
represents rm xed e¤ects.
The validity of the di¤erence-in di¤erences approach relies on satisfying the parallel trend
assumption. When applied to equation (1), this assumption requires that the dependent
variable would have followed the same trend for both groups (with and without strategic
complementarities) in the absence of the credit shock.
Figure 5 plots the time series for investment for both groups of rms, with both series
indexed to 100 in 2008. The gure shows a clear message: the trends in both groups are
nearly identical until 2008, whereas in 2009 there is a clear break. After the onset of the
crisis, the time series for investment by rms with large DM indices continues its downward
trajectory, whereas investment for the group of rms with low DM indices grows in 2009 and
later returns to the 2008 level. Such evolution in investment for both groups suggests that
the parallel trend assumption applies.
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Figure 5: The parallel trend assumption. The gure plots the evolution of the ratio investment
over assets for rms with strategic complementarities (solid line) and rms without strategic
complementarities (dotted line). The reference year is 2008, in which the ratio of investment
over assets takes the value 100.
6.2.1 Baseline results
Table 3 presents the estimates of regression equation (1). The key coe¢ cient of interest is
3 the coe¢ cient on the interaction term which measures the impact of the credit shock on
the investment of rms with strong strategic complementarities. Standard errors are clustered
at the rm-level to correct for within-rm residual correlation.
Columns (1) and (2) do not include controls or the dummy variable for strategic comple-
mentarities, but include xed e¤ects and a dummy variable for the credit contraction. Column
(1) presents the basic patterns of investment. We nd that, on average, annual investment as
a fraction of assets declined by 3:71 percentage points following the onset of the credit shock,
which compares with the unconditional mean of 5 percent.4
Column (2) includes the interaction term. Following the onset of the credit shock, annual
investment (as a fraction of assets) declined by 2:09 percentage points more for rms with
strategic complementarities. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term shows that the decline in
investment is economically large and statistically signicant for rms with strategic comple-
mentaries, thus establishing a role for spillover e¤ects in the aftermath of the credit shock.
The remaining columns include the control variables. Column (3) considers random ef-
fects and column (4) includes rm xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on the dummy for strategic
4Banco de Portugal reports a fall of 16% in the gross xed capital formation for the same period.
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complementarities in column (3) suggests that rms with strategic complementarities invest
around 1 percentage point more than rms without strategic complementarities. Yet, the
Hausman test unambiguously rejects the existence of random e¤ects. Column (4) considers
the existence of xed e¤ects, and shows that the di¤erential e¤ect between rms with and
without strategic complementarities increases to about 2:12 percentage points, and the e¤ect
remains highly statistically signicant.
We use the rms total debt (as a fraction of assets) in year t to control for external
nance constraints. Yet, variation in rms total debt as the crisis unfolds may be related to
unobserved changes in its investment opportunities to some extent, total debt is endogenous
to the choices made by the rm. We remove these changes from our specication by using
(only) the total debt over assets before the crisis. This is equivalent to using instrumental
variables, assuming that the ratio of debt to assets before the crisis is not correlated with
unobserved within-rm changes in investment opportunities after 2008. In Column (5) from
Table 3, we repeat the exercise in column (3) replacing debt over assets in each year by the
debt over assets in 2006. The table documents economically equivalent results, since the
coe¢ cient on the interaction term does not change substantially between the two alternative
di¤erence-in-di¤erences specications.
The estimates in column (6) include time dummies to control for aggregate shocks (which
subsume the CCt variable) together with rm xed e¤ects. The estimate of the di¤erential
impact increases to 2:17 percentage points and continues to be highly statistically signicant.
In the previous columns we have compared the e¤ects in the period 2006-2008 with the
e¤ects in period 2009-2012, which we have labeled as the periods "before" and "after" the
shock. Instead, in column (7) we compare the e¤ects in 2008 with the e¤ects in 2009. To this
purpose, we consider time dummies which take a value of 1 in year t and 0 otherwise, with
the base year being 2008 (i.e. there is no dummy variable for year 2008). We interact the
strategic complementarities dummy SCi with the time dummies, and the key interaction term
multiplies the dummy variable SCi with the time dummy for year 2009. Results show that
from the end of 2008 until the end of 2009, rms with strategic complementarities reduce (on
average) their investment (as a fraction of assets) by 4:45 percentage points more than rms
without strategic complementarities. The e¤ect is statistically signicant, thus reinforcing the
economic signicance of spillover e¤ects.
77
6.3 Robustness checks: an alternative to identify the shock
We now address potential concerns with our baseline specication. First, we have dened the
year 2009 as the year of the shock but there may be some concerns that this may not be the
correct year that is, the dummy CCt does not correctly identify the economic shock. We
have tested with other years, and the year 2009 is the year with the largest economic e¤ects
and with the most statistically signicant coe¢ cients. For example, results on column (7) in
Table 3 conrm that 2009 is the year of the credit shock, since it has the largest estimated
coe¢ cient (in absolute terms) on the interaction term as well as the most signicant. Still,
it could be that the credit shock does not hit all industries simultaneously, and the spillover
e¤ects from strategic complementarities hit rms at di¤erent times.
Another concern is that the initial credit shock hits industries heterogeneously, since banks
might have cut credit more to some industries than to others (and have thus generated di¤erent
spillover e¤ects across industries). In this case, a dummy variable will not fully capture the
richness of the information found in the data.
To address these concerns, we change the denition of the variable which proxies the
credit contraction. We repeat the baseline specication, replacing the dummy variable for
the periods "before" and "after" the shock with a variable which measures the evolution of
credit for each industry. We hope to identify the spillover e¤ects which derive from the credit
contraction for each particular industry.
We use the total debt (normalized by assets) of an industry as a proxy for the industrys
bank credit. We sum the total debt of the rms belonging to a given industry to obtain the
total debt of the industry the debt reported in rmsbalances sheets is closely related with
bank credit since most of the credit to SMEs is granted by banks. Being a continuous variable
which takes values for all years in our sample, the new variable solves our two concerns.
We apply a di¤erence-in di¤erences specication similar to equation (1), where we replace
the variable CCt by the variable Debtit which measures the di¤erence between the values
of year t and of year t  1 for the total debt of the industry (normalized by assets) to which
rm i belongs (the credit to the industry to which rm i belongs falls as long as the variable
Debtit takes negative values).
INVit = 1 + 1Debtit + 2SCi + 3Debtit:SCi + 4Wit + t + i + it
All other variables are as dened earlier. The interaction term Debtit:SCi combines the
variation in industrys debt with its strategic complementarity level, and we want to evaluate
if the coe¢ cient 3 is positive and statistically signicant. Column (1) in Table 4 reports the
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results for the estimated equation.
The results are broadly consistent with the previous results. The coe¢ cient on the inter-
action term 3 suggests that a reduction of 1 percentage point in the ratio of debt variation
over assets for an industry with strategic complementarities, on average leads to a decline in
rmsannual investment as a fraction of assets equal to 0:172 percentage points more than
for industries without complementarities.
6.4 Robustness checks: sample splits
The regression model (1) was specied according to our theoretical priors, and we have added
controls to the specication to capture additional sources of rm heterogeneity. But the
inclusion of controls in the regression per se does not address the fact that the two groups
being compared may have very di¤erent characteristics (see, for example, Heckman et al.,
1998). When the control variables have poor distributional overlap, one can improve the
estimation of group di¤erences by estimating the model for more homogenous groups of rms.
Motivated by the potential sensitivity of our results to our sample, we estimate the model
for appropriately selected subsamples. For the same reason, we will also conduct our analysis
combining a di¤erence-in di¤erences approach with the use of matching estimators.
6.4.1 Handling a possible sample selection problem
One obvious concern about our identication strategy is the sample selection problem, which
could arise from the possible migration by rms from those banks which have restricted their
loans to those banks which have not. Since 2009, "good" rms could have migrated from
banks which have restricted their credit or, instead, these banks could have "cherry-picked"
the "good" rms. In any of these cases, the portfolio of banks which restricted their credit
after 2009 represents a biased sample. For the same reason, the set of rms which has migrated
among banks is also a biased sample.
For these reasons, we focus on those rms which have worked exclusively with banks which
were more willing to extend loans to rms in the period 2009-2012. This strategy alleviates
concerns about sample selection, such as bank-rm sorting.
The next step is to identify those banks which were less reluctant to extend loans to rms
after 2009. Capital adequacy ratios have a major impact on the willingness of banks to grant
credit (see, for example, Bebchuk and Goldstein 2011).
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In 2012, given the increasing capital requirements imposed to Portuguese banks, some of
the biggest Portuguese banks were required to ask for capital state support this possibility
had already been planned in the Memorandum of Understanding. Augusto and Felix (2014)
analyzed the e¤ects of this recapitalization in the period between 2010 and 2013 and its e¤ect
on rmscredit access, concluding that these bailout operations contributed to an increase in
credit supply, that is, they prevented an even sharper break of loan growth rates.
Portuguese banks Banco Comercial Português, Banco Português de Investimento, and
Caixa Geral de Depósitos (the state-owned bank) were bailed out in June 2012, and Banco
Internacional do Funchal in December 2012 by the issuance of contingent convertible bonds,
which allowed these banks to comply with minimum capital requirements dened by Eu-
ropean Banking Authority and by Banco de Portugal. This recapitalization operation was
necessary to reinforce bankscapital base, in a scenario of adverse macroeconomic conditions
and compression of their net interest margins.
The depletion of capital is a long process and it is likely that banks may have started to
face problems as early as 2009. This would imply that bank lending has been a¤ected since
2009. Figure 6 depicts the evolution of total bank loans granted by each of the four largest
Portuguese banks, and shows that the only bank that was not bailed out (Banco Espírito
Santo) was precisely the one that has restricted its lending by less.5
Sabi contains information about the bank relationships of each individual rm for each
year. We divide our sample of rms into three distinct groups: (i) rms which worked only
with non-bailed out banks, (ii) rms which worked only with bailed out banks, and (iii) rms
which worked with both types of banks. The reference period to build these three groups
was 2006-2012. Figure 7 plots the evolution of the average values of the total debt di¤erence
between two consecutive years (as a fraction of assets) for the three distinct groups considered.
The debt of rms which only worked with bailed out banks su¤ered a severe decrease in 2009,
whereas the total debt of rms which worked exclusively with non-bailed out banks remained
almost constant over time.
Having in mind Figures 6 and 7 , we consider a sample of rms which have obtained bank
loans during the period 2006-2012 exclusively from banks which were not bailed out. Column
(2) in Table 4 reports the estimates of equation (1) for the restricted sample. The results in the
sub-sample reinforce the results in the baseline regressions. On average, rms with strategic
complementarities reduce their investment (as a fraction of assets) by 6:08 percentage points
more than rms without complementarities following the 2009 credit crunch.
5Caixa Geral de Depósitos, the state owned bank, exihbits a lending behaviour similar to Banco Espírito
Santo, but anecdotal evidence points out that Caixa Geral de Depósitos has made a large e¤ort to o¤set the
decrease in aggregate bank lending after 2008.
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Figure 6: E¤ect of the 2009 credit shock on the lending behaviour by the four largest Por-
tuguese banks. This gure plots total loans volumes considering 2008 as the reference year.
We use Bankscope data for the four main Portuguese banks: Caixa Geral de Depóstios (CGD),
Banco Comercial Português (BCP), Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) and Banco Es-
pírito Santo (BES). Together these banks represent 60-70% of corporate debt.
6.4.2 Demand shocks
Another potential concern in our identication strategy is whether unobserved changes in
investment opportunities may have biased our results. For example if the demand for goods
produced by rms with strategic complementarities has fallen after 2009, then these rms
would nd optimal to reduce their production (and investment) and such e¤ect would not
be related with the existence of spillover e¤ects from strategic complementarities. Put more
formally, our concern is that unobserved di¤erences between both groups of rms trigger sharp
contrasts in the post-crisis period because of changes in the environment other than spillover
e¤ects.
To address these concerns, we restrict our sample to exporting rms. The e¤ect of the
2009 credit contraction on investment of exporting rms is very unlike to be explained by a
reduction in the internal demand for their products, since these rms have the means to o¤set
this reduction.
Column (3) of Table 4 shows the estimates of equation (1) when we restrict the sample
to exporting rms which borrowed exclusively from non-bailed out banks in the period 2006-
2012. The results are also statistical signicant and with similar magnitudes to the baseline
regressions. On average, rms with strategic complementarities reduce their investment (as
a fraction of assets) by 3:12 percentage points more than rms without complementarities.
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Figure 7: Evolution of rmsvariation of debt over assets. This gure plots average values
of the ratio year-on-year total debt di¤erence over assets for (i) rms which during all the
considered period of time worked only with non-bailout banks (solid line), rms which during
all the considered period of time worked only with bailout banks (dashed line), and rms which
work with both type of banks during the considered period of time (dotted line). Banks which
were bailout: Banco Comercial Português, Banco Português de Investimento, Caixa Geral
de Depóstios and Banco Internacional do Funchal. Banks which were not bailout: Banco
Espírito Santo, Banco Santander, Banco Popular, Finibanco, Caixa de Crédito Agrícola,
Banco Bilbao Viscaya, Barclays Bank, Montepio Geral, Fortis Bank, BNP Paribas, Caja de
Ahorros, Deutsche Bank, Banco BIC, Banco Finantia, Banco Popular, ABN AMRO bank,
Banco Privado, Banco Totta, Banco Best and Credit Lyonnais. We exclude the 10 rms which
have borrowed from Banco Português dos Negócios, since this bank was nationalized in 2010.
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Column (4) of Table 4 considers all exporting rms (regardless of whether they have borrowed
from bailed out banks or not), and broadly conrms the previous results.
7 Counterfactual Matching Approach
Our main goal is to gauge how strategic complementarities a¤ected rms in the aftermath
of the 2009 credit shock. To this purpose we isolate the rms which benet from strategic
complementarities. We would like to compare their observed investment after 2009 (which
was a¤ected by spillover e¤ects) with their non-observed investment had their neighbors not
been caught by the credit contraction. Naturally this is a di¢ cult task. One way to tackle this
problem is to estimate the di¤erence between the investment actually observed in the data and
a plausible counterfactual investment. Since rms without strategic complementarities are not
a¤ected by spillover e¤ects from their neighbors, these rms provide a natural counterfactual.
We conduct our analysis combining a di¤erence-in di¤erences approach with the use of a
matching estimator. The idea behind this approach is that of isolating rms with strategic
complementarities, and then, from the population of rms without complementarities look
for control observations that best match the observations on rms with complementarities.
We are assuming that if it were not for the existence of strategic complementarities, both
groups of rms would have behaved similarly. The matches are made so as to ensure that
observations in both groups have identical distributions along some pre-specied dimensions.
We employ the propensity score matching estimator of the "average e¤ect of the treatment
on the treated" proposed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003), using observed characteristics (such
as assets, sales, cash ow, number of employees, and being an exporting rm or not) as inputs
in a probit regression where the dependent variable is the dummy variable SCi which identies
rms with strategic complementarities.6 For each rm with strategic complementarities, the
procedure nds the rm without complementarities with the closest propensity score. Once
the assignment has been done, we can measure the di¤erence-in di¤erences in investment
between both groups.
Table 5 shows that, on average, rms with strategic complementarities reduce their in-
vestment (as a fraction of assets) by 3:26 percentage points more than rms without com-
plementarities. The magnitude of this estimate is comparable with the magnitude of the
6We could have applied the Abadie and Imbens (2011) estimator, which minimizes the Mahalanobis distance
between the vector of observed covariates across treated and non-treated rms to nd control rms. This
estimator produces exact matches on categorical variables, but the matches on continuous variables are not
exact. Given the relatively limited size of our sample, exact matches are sometimes unavailable. One way to
deal with the problem of dimension in this setting is to use propensity score matching.
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most demanding estimate we obtained with the sample splits (that is, when the sample was
restricted to exporting rms which worked exclusively with non-bailed out banks), with the
advantage of having a number of observations which is substantially larger.
8 Conclusion
We study the impact of the 2009 Portuguese credit crunch on rms with strategic complemen-
tarities. More specically, we study the role of spillover e¤ects on rmsinvestment decisions.
We nd that corporate investment declines signicantly following the onset of the credit
crunch, controlling for rm xed e¤ects. On average, annual investment as a fraction of assets
declined by 3:71 percentage points in the aftermath of the credit shock, which compares with
the unconditional mean of 5 percent.
Consistent with a causal e¤ect, the decline is greatest for rms with intense strategic com-
plementarities. In our baseline regression, we estimate that annual investment (as a fraction
of assets) declines by 2:17 percentage points more for rms with strategic complementarities.
To address selection bias and endogeneity concerns we restrict our sample to exporting
rms which established banking relationships exclusively with banks which did not restrict
their credit. Our goal is to isolate spillover e¤ects among those among rms which did not
see their credit restricted and su¤ered no change in investment opportunities. The estimate
of the di¤erential impact increases to 3:12 percentage points and continues to be statistically
signicant.
In a nal step, we conduct our analysis combining a di¤erence-in di¤erences approach
with the use of matching estimators. We estimate that rms with strategic complementarities
reduce their investment (as a fraction of assets) by 3:26 percentage points more than rms
without strategic complementarities, following the onset of the credit shock. The magnitude of
this estimate is comparable with the magnitude of the most demanding estimate we obtained
with the sample splits (that is, when the sample was restricted to exporting rms which
worked exclusively with non-bailed out banks), with the advantage of having a number of
observations which is substantially larger.
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9 Tables
Summary statistics
Panel A reports summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The sample
period is 2006 to 2012. Employees is the number of rms employees. Capital/Assets is
the ratio between capital (xed tangible assets plus depreciations) and assets (total assets).
Investment/Assetsis the ratio between investment (xed tangible assets plus depreciations
in period t minus xed tangible assets in period t-1) and assets. Debt/Assets is the ratio
between total debt (long and short term debt) and assets. CashFlow/Assets is the ratio
between cash ow and assets. Sales is the value of total sales. Sales Variation is the
net sales growth rate. Bank lending relationshipsis the number of banks with which rms
establish relationship. Panel B reports mean values for the same variables, distinguishing
between rms with ("WithSC") and without ("WithoutSC") strategic complementarities.
Di¤erences in means are assessed with the t-test.
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Panel A: mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for all observations
Mean StandDev Min Max
Employees (n) 48.75 44.41 10.00 246.00
Capital/Assets 0.30 0.21 0.00 1.23
Investment/Assets 0.05 0.24 -16.81 0.87
Debt/Assets 0.22 0.22 0.00 6.11
CashFlow/Assets 0.07 0.11 -2.69 1.01
Sales (euros) 4418.31 9912.47 0.00 243291.49
Sales Variation 8.60 35.23 -97.40 991.84
Assets (euros) 4612.42 13158.94 5.00 279324.54
Bank lending relationships (n) 3 2 1 11
N obs 7644
Panel B: mean values for rms with and without strategic complementarities
WithoutSC WithSC Di¤erence p-value
Employees (n) 43.21 50.09 -6.89 0.00
Capital/Assets 0.28 0.3 -0.02 0.00
Investment/Assets 0.06 0.05 0 0.54
Debt/Assets 0.23 0.21 0.02 0.00
CashFlow/Assets 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.00
Sales (euros) 8,071.69 3,533.76 4,537.92 0.00
Sales Variation 8.09 8.73 -0.64 0.53
Assets (euros) 8,732.26 3,614.93 5,117.33 0.00
Bank lending relationships (n) 2.71 2.52 0.19 0.00
N obs 1490 6154
Table 1: Summary statistics
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The e¤ect of the shock on rmsinvestment
The table presents results for the two groups of rms (with and without strategic com-
plementarities) in which we compare investment before the onset of the crisis to investment
after. In the comparison, we average each rms time series into two sample means one for
the period 2006-2008, which we label as "before the crisis", and one for the period 2009-2012,
which we label as "after the crisis". Di¤erences in means are assessed with the t-test.
Before the crisis After the crisis Di¤erence (p-value)
Without SC 0.066 0.050 0.016 0.005
With SC 0.077 0.037 0.040 0.000
N obs 2915 4729
Table 2: The e¤ect of the shock on rmsinvestment
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The e¤ect of the shock on rmsinvestment (regressions estimates)
This table shows estimates from panel regressions of the e¤ect of a credit contraction shock
on rms investment, comparing rms with and without strategic complementarities. The
dependent variable is rms investment. Observations are at the rm-year level. Coe¢ cients
in columns (3) and (5) are estimated by random e¤ects. Columns (1), (2), (4), (6) and (7)
consider rms xed e¤ects. Control variables include sales (net sales variation), cash ows,
debt and an exporter activity dummy. The variables denition is provided in Appendix.
Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. *, **, *** denote statistical signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively and t statistics are in parentheses. SC - strategic
complementarities dummy, CC - credit shock dummy, Sales - net sales variation, A - assets,
Exporter - exporter dummy, RE - random e¤ects, FE - xed e¤ects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SC 0.0091* 0.0092*
(1.69) (1.68)
CC -0.0371*** -0.0204*** -0.0126** -0.0201*** -0.0115**
(-10.67) (-3.85) (-2.26) (-3.66) (-2.05)
CC*SC -0.0209*** -0.0249*** -0.0212*** -0.0261*** -0.0217***
(-3.11) (-3.34) (-3.17) (-3.39) (-3.24)
Sales 0.00019*** 0.0001** 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0001*
(4.77) (2.02) (4.68) (1.81) (1.80)
CashFlows/A 0.156*** 0.0708** 0.137*** 0.0681** 0.0670**
(4.79) (2.33) (4.87) (2.04) (2.03)
Debt/A 0.0420** 0.0426 0.0438 0.0445
(2.21) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50)
Debt/A_06 0.0006
(0.05)
Exporter 0.0017 0.0212 0.0028 0.0208 0.0204
(0.19) (1.29) (0.31) (1.31) (1.29)
DSC_D06 -0.009
(-0.58)
DSC_D07 -0.0009
(-0.10)
DSC_D09 -0.0445**
(-2.20)
DSC_D10 -0.0278**
(-2.15)
DSC_D11 -0.0145
(-1.63)
DSC_D12 -0.0102
(-1.02)
Constant 0.0758*** 0.0758*** 0.0437*** 0.0462*** 0.0531*** 0.0336** 0.0339**
(35.21) (35.26) (3.51) (2.90) (4.94) (2.31) (2.34)
RE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.0069 0.0072 0.0079 0.0092 0.0077 0.0122 0.0126
N obs 7644 7644 7644 7644 7644 7644 7644
Table 3: The e¤ect of the shock on rmsinvestment (regressions estimates)
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Robustness checks
In column (1) we use the di¤erence between the values of year t and of year t  1 for the
total debt of the industry (normalized by assets) as the explanatory variable to determine
the shock. Columns (2)  (4) shows estimates for appropriately selected subsamples. In
column (2) we restrict the sample to rms which worked only with non-bailout banks. In
column (3) we restrict the sample to rms which worked only with non-bailout banks and are
exporters. In column (4) we restrict the sample to all exporting rms. Observations are at
the rm-year level. All columns consider rms xed e¤ects. Control variables include sales
(net sales variation), cash ows, total debt and an exporter activity dummy. The variables
denition is provided in Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. *, **, ***
denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively and t statistics are
in parentheses. SC - strategic complementarities dummy, CC - credit shock dummy.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
DifDebt/Assets industry level (Debt) 0.0244
(1.07)
Debt*SC 0.172**
(2.10)
CC*SC -0.0608*** -0.0312* -0.0147**
(-3.58) (-1.90) (-2.10)
Net Sales Variation 0.000142** 0.00000516 0.000262** 0.0000571
(2.08) (0.03) (2.17) (1.25)
Cash Flows 0.0914*** -0.0244 -0.0760 0.00737
(2.64) (-0.32) (-0.94) (0.32)
Debt 0.0302 -0.101** -0.00223 0.0198
(1.08) (-2.14) (-0.06) (1.43)
Exporter dummy 0.0143 -0.00990
(0.92) (-0.74)
Constant 0.0262 0.0767*** 0.0530*** 0.0550***
(1.58) (4.85) (5.81) (12.02)
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0031 0.2167 0.1030 0.0392
N obs 7644 574 367 5197
Table 4: Robustness checks
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Counterfactual Matching Approach
This table shows the di¤erence-in di¤erences of rm investment before and after the credit
crisis with di¤erence-in di¤erences estimator (DiD) and DiD matching estimator. For the DID
we consider the most demanding sample-split with exporting rms which worked exclusively
with non-bailed out banks, without control variables but controlling for rms xed e¤ects and
standard errors clustered at the rm level. For the DiD matching estimator we employ the
propensity score estimator of the "average e¤ect of the treatment on the treated" proposed
by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). *, **, *** denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Before the shock After the shock Di¤erence N obs
Without SC 0.0595 0.0631 0.0036 69
With SC 0.0595 0.0302 -0.0293 298
DiD 0 -0.0329 -0.0329* 367
DiD matching estimator (ATT) -0.0326** 1103
Table 5: Counterfactual Matching Approach
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A Appendix
List of industries proposed by Guimarães et al. (2007)
With Strategic Complementarities
Industry Code Industry Description
171 Preparation and spinning of cotton-type bres
172 Cotton-type weaving
173 Bleaching and dyeing
176 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics
183 Tanning and dressing of fur
192 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness
193 Manufacture of footwear
223 Reproduction of sound recording
244 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products or medicaments
247 Manufacture of man-made bres
263 Manufacture of ceramic tiles
296 Manufacture of hunting, sporting or protective rearms and ammunition
323 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording
332 Manufacture of instruments for measuring electricity, gas water and other uid
334 Manufacture of optical non-ophthalmic instruments
341 Manufacture of motor vehicles
354 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles
362 Manufacture of ligree
363 Manufacture of musical instruments
Table 6: Industries with strategic complementarities
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Without Strategic Complementarities
Industry Code Industry Description
242 Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products
268 Production of abrasive products and manufacture of bituminous mixtures
271 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys
272 Manufacture of steel tubes
273 Cold rolling of narrow strip and cold forming or folding and wire drawing
274 Aluminium, lead, zinc, tin, copper and other non-ferrous metal production
283 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers
294 Manufacture of portable hand held power tools, other metalworking machine tools
297 Manufacture of electric and non-electric domestic appliances
311 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers
322 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters
333 Manufacture of industrial process control equipment
335 Manufacture of watches and clocks
353 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft
364 Manufacture of sports goods
365 Manufacture of games and toys
Table 7: Industries without strategic complementarities
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List applied exclusions on rms selection
N rms N obs (panel)
Firms in selected industries 8852
Firms with balance sheet information 5304
Firms with >=10 and <250 employees 1945
. . . with information on Assets, Investment and Sales 1901 13401
. . . between 2006-2012 1392 7875
. . . excluding industries which depend on natural resources 1224 7644
Table 8: List of applied exclusions
Industries which depend on natural resources are: industry 232 - petroleum rening,
industry 351 - shipbuilding and repairing, industry 152 - sea products processing, industry
160 - tobacco and industry 372 - recycling of non-metallic products.
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Variables denition and Sabi codes
Variable Name Description Sabi Codes
id Firm scal number
CAE Industry (CAE Rev. 2.1)
d_withsc Firms with SC identication
t Balance sheet year
Number_Employees Number of employees 747
D0i Time dummy for 200i, i:6-13
DC0i Interaction term (d_withsc x D0i)
Assets Assets 706
TFAssets Tangible xed assets 734
TFAssets_Assets Tangible xed assets over Assets 734/706
Capital Capital (TFAssets+Depreciation) 734+745
Capital_Assets Capital assets over Assets (734+745)/706
Investment (Capex) (TFAssets+Depreciation)t - (TFAssets)t 1 (734+745)t - (734)t 1
Investment_Assets Investment over Assets ((734+745)t - (734)t 1)/706
Debt_Assets Debt over Assets (738+729)/706
VarDebt Debtt - Debtt 1 (738+729)t - (738+729)t 1
VarDebt_Assets VarDebt over Assets ((738+729)t - (738+729)t 1)/706t
CashFlow Cash Flows 717
CashFlow_Assets Cash Flows over Assets 717/706
Sales_DemResult Sales 727
NetSalesVariation Net sales growth rate 86
Table 9: Variables denition and Sabi codes
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